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Abstract. The world is facing a future of sensored surveillance, filled with pervasive ultrasmall connected devices, added to relatively larger ones already present in appliances and
everyday technology today. Sensors will be bound to people as well as the environment, and
people will provide much of the data that will compose the fundamental building blocks of a
decisional infrastructure. Threats emanating from incompetence, unethical conduct, criminals,
and nation states will put national security at increased risk because of new levels of potential
harm to individual citizens as well as potential damage to physical infrastructure. A future that
includes intimate electronic connections with a person’s body creates an imperative to secure
a Network of Persons (NoP), rather than of things. Sensor driven collection of huge amounts
of data from individuals can impact the fundamental meaning of citizenship, affect economic
prosperity, and define personal identity, all in a world composed of dwindling nodes of
mediation between humans and automated systems. Intimately connected technology is
increasingly interweaving persons in ways that extend the importance and relevance of critical
infrastructure protections to the person. The present disjointed and fragmented approaches
of Europe and the United States exacerbate the problems and elevate the importance of
reconsidering designations of critical infrastructure. A new designation of a Critical Network
of Persons (CNoP) does not obviate or alleviate the risks associated with the technologies;
rather, it begins to shift the burden of risk mitigation and protection away from those least
capable, towards the state and its partners. This paper proposes critical infrastructure
protection for life critical functions in the NoP and argues that because the person is the
building block for this critical infrastructure protection, the government’s duty is qualitatively
different from its duty to protect other critical infrastructures. Establishing a CNoP reorients
the scope and focus to that of the citizen, the person—the building block of the nation.
Ensuring the security at the individual level is imperative for maintaining national security for
all.
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CRITICAL PROTECTION FOR THE NETWORK OF PERSONS
A human is sometimes considered as a ‘thing’ in public discourse related to IoT [Internet of Things].
–NIST, Networks of ‘Things’
Act in such a way that you treat humanity . . . never merely as a means to an end, but always at
the same time as an end.
–Immanuel Kant
INTRODUCTION
In November, 2017, the Food and Drug Administration approved a pill with an embedded
sensor for use in the human body for the first time.1 Intended to track whether a patient is taking a
prescribed medicinal course of treatment, the sensor moves through the body and communicates with
a patch worn by a patient, then sends information to an application on the patient’s cellphone which
forwards that information to a pharmaceutical company or a medical facility. 2 Another example for a
pioneering sensor technology, “smart dust” about the size of a dust particle, is indistinguishable from
the surrounding environment. Smart dust is a tiny sensor designed to collect data from the environment,
physical connections, and persons—all of which are trackable to identified places.3 The future will likely
be filled with pervasive ultra-small connected devices in addition to the relatively larger ones already
present in appliances and everyday technology today. Sensors will be bound to people as well as the
environment, and people will provide much of the data that will compose the fundamental building
blocks of a decisional infrastructure. Threats emanating from incompetence, unethical conduct,
criminals, and nation states will put national security at increased risk because of new levels of potential
harm to individual citizens as well as potential damage to physical infrastructure.
One such threat occurred in 2016, when one of the most broadly felt denial of service
cyberattacks in the United States shut down the Internet in areas of the country for three hours because
it preyed on vulnerabilities found in small Internet of Things (IoT) devices such as light bulbs and
kitchen appliances.4 Extrapolated to a future that includes an intimate electronic connection with a
person’s body, this incident foreshadows a time when there will be an imperative to secure an
infrastructure that is connected to persons rather than things. When a plethora of devices—from ever
1
Pam Belluck, First Digital Pill Approved to Worries About Biomedical ‘Big Brother,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/13/health/digital-pill-fda.html?emc=eta1[https://perma.cc/3MJF-G3RT];
Jonah
Comstock, In-Depth: How Digital Sensors Could Change The Face of Pharma, MOBILE HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 17, 2017),
http://www.mobihealthnews.com/content/depth-how-digital-sensors-could-change-face-pharma [https://perma.cc/6MVMYUQU].
2

Belluck, supra note 1.

3

See Courtney Goldsmith, Microscopic ‘Smart Dust’ Sensors are Set to Revolutionise a Range of Sectors, NEW ECONOMY (June
3, 2019), https://www.theneweconomy.com/technology/microscopic-smart-dust-sensors-are-set-to-revolutionise-a-range-ofsectors [https://perma.cc/XTT9-D2PM](describing what smart dust is); Rebecca Rubin, Smart Dust: Just a Speck Goes a Long Way
in the Erosion of Fundamental Privacy Rights, 15 J. HIGH TECH. L. 329, 342–46 (2015).
4
See Sam Thielman & Elle Hunt, Cyber Attack: Hackers ‘Weaponised’ Everyday Devices With Malware, The Guardian (Oct.
22, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/22/cyber-attack-hackers-weaponised-everyday-devices-withmalware-to-mount-assault [https://perma.cc/M6QK-B3YH].
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present sensors embedded in streets to nanoparticles coursing through individual bodies—collect and
share minutely and continually updated personal data, then the infrastructure to be secured will
encompass the individual. While the IoT 5 and cyber-physical systems have captured our regulatory
attention, technology is accelerating so rapidly that soon individuals will have granular connections with
systems of sensors so embedded in the environment that it is no longer sufficient to contemplate
societal expectations in an IoT. Instead, legal and social institutions must conceive of what it means to
regulate and secure a different environment: an infrastructure substantially connecting individuals to
critical systems at a personal level. Sensor-driven infrastructure collecting a huge amount of data from
individuals can impact the fundamental meaning of citizenship, affect economic prosperity, and define
personal identity, all in a world composed of dwindling nodes of mediation between humans and
automated systems.
When we think of infrastructure in this new way, the values and human rights of persons are
integral parts of the infrastructure in need of protection. To make this argument, Part I first establishes
a basis for the belief that future cyber systems will evolve around connected persons and will soon be
a reality. This Part then uses the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) systems model
to describe and define the attributes of such a personally connective system, that we call a Network of
Persons (NoP). Part II describes the threats to and vulnerabilities of the NoP, and conceptualizes
protection for life critical functions in the NoP. It argues that these life critical functions must become
the focus of national security protection in the interest of the individual and the nation. Part III
discusses how to achieve appropriate protection of the NoP infrastructure within national security
protection. To this effect, it describes and compares U.S. and EU regulatory approaches to critical
infrastructure protection, and analyses how these contrasting approaches translate to life-critical
functions in the NoP. Because the person is the building block for this critical infrastructure protection,
it is argued that the government’s duty is qualitatively different than its duty to protect other critical
infrastructures.
I. DEFINING THE NETWORK OF PERSONS (NOP)
Much has been written about the IoT, the Internet of Everything, and Cyber-Physical
systems.6 While there are degrees of difference, in this context the concepts are generally equivalent.
5
Arkady Zaslavsky, September 2013 Theme: Internet of Things and Ubiquitous Sensing, IEEE COMPUT. SOC’Y,
https://www.computer.org/publications/tech-news/computing-now/internet-of-things-and-ubiquitous-sensing)
[https://perma.cc/Y5B8-N4AV] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020) (“[T]he Internet of Things (IoT) will comprise many billions of
Internet-connected objects (ICOs) or “things” that can sense, communicate, compute, and potentially actuate, as well as have
intelligence, multimodal interfaces, physical/virtual identities, and attributes.”).
6

NIST uses the term Cyber-Physical Systems, which includes the Internet of Things and “[s]mart anything.” CyberPhysical Systems, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., https://www.nist.gov/el/cyber-physical-systems [https://perma.cc/5VQUSFJ5] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020). Within the legal literature, see these leading articles: Scott R. Peppet, Regulation the Internet of
Things: First Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85 (2014); Adam D. Thierer, The
Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns Without Derailing Innovation, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 6
(2015); There are many recent articles about the Internet of Things. See generally, Jane Kirtley & Scott Memmel, Too Smart For Its
Own Good: Addressing the Privacy and Security of the Internet of Things, 22 J. INTERNET L., Oct. 2018; Nicole Smith, Protecting Consumers
in the Age of the Internet of Things, 93 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 851 (2019); Lawrence J. Trautman et al., Governance of the Internet of Things
(IOT), 60 JURIMETRICS J. 315 (2020); Charlotte A. Tschider, Regulation the Internet of Things: Discrimination, Privacy, and Cybersecurity
in the Artificial Intelligence Age, 96 DENV. L. REV. 87 (2018).
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Each describes a world of connected devices, usually employing a type of sensor that is designed to
collect, or sense, information, and transmit the data, often by means of an Internet connection.7
Multiple types of sensors are in use today in everyday life. Apple iPhone technology, for example, uses
sensors in the process of facial recognition that are crucial to the mapping of a person’s face in order
to unlock the phone.8 Audio sensors, such as those used by Amazon’s Alexa, 9 can be used not only to
respond to instructions or questions, but also to identify a person by her unique speech patterns. 10 The
types and uses of sensors are almost endless, embedded in things such as smart buildings and cars and
from wearable health fitness appliances to patient monitoring devices and smart pharmaceuticals. 11
Sensors are simply everywhere, and the future proliferation of sensors will be able to monitor and
collect data about the most personal aspects of an individual’s life.
Beyond current ubiquitous sensor applications, the advent of future and near-future
technology will soon be reality. Although technology will continue to develop in unpredicted ways, a
few illustrative descriptions of methods for an intensively, personally connected environment set the
stage for what is to come. The technologies described here are on the cusp of realization and are used
in limited circumstances or proof-of-concept rollouts today.
A. Person Level Connectivity
Forthcoming technologies significantly advance methods of sensing a person’s existence and
identity. 12 “Hypersensing” describes a technological tsunami of sensors collecting information that is
fed into systems of machine learning based across industries and places.13 Hypersensing means that the
7
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-75, INTERNET OF THINGS: STATUS AND IMPLICATIONS OF AN
INCREASINGLY CONNECTED WORLD 7 (2017) (describing the three layers as hardware, where sensors are located, network, such
as Wi-Fi, and software, which is needed to collect the data).
8
See JV Chamary, How Face ID Works On iPhone X, FORBES (Sept. 16, 2017, 5:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jvchamary/2017/09/16/how-face-id-works-apple-iphone-x/#64e4da52624d
[https://perma.cc/5HSR-27JU]; Michael deAgonia, Apple’s Face ID [The iPhone X’s Facial Recognition Tech] Explained,
COMPUTERWORLD (Nov. 1, 2017, 2:57 AM), https://www.computerworld.com/article/3235140/apple-ios/apples-face-id-theiphone-xs-facial-recognition-tech-explained.html [https://perma.cc/3M4Z-QQN9].
9
See Jefferson Graham, Alexa Guard Can Now Listen for Alarms—Or, Perhaps, a Cheating Spouse?, USA TODAY (May 14,
2019, 9:40 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/talkingtech/2019/05/14/alexas-latest-skill-listening-alarms-andsnooping-home-life/1189230001 [https://perma.cc/T3ZP-GEKB].
10
See Omesh Tickoo, Making Sense of Sensors—Types and Levels of Recognition, APRESS (May 5, 2017),
https://www.apress.com/gp/blog/all-blog-posts/making-sense-of-sensors/12253808 [https://perma.cc/A6B9-H36G].
11
See Janine S. Hiller, Healthy Predictions? Questions for Data Analytics in Health Care, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 251, 275–76 (2016)
(explaining that patient mobile connected devices feed into health care data); Scott J. Shackelford et al., When Toasters Attack: A
Polycentric Approach to Enhancing the “Security of Things,” 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 415, 418 (2017) (stating that “nearly everything not
currently connected to the Internet, from gym shorts to streetlights, soon will be.”).
12
See Martin Geddes, Introducing Hypersense & Human Technology, DEWAYNE-NET (Jan. 31, 2015),
https://dewaynenet.wordpress.com/2015/02/01/introducing-hypersense-human-technology
[https://perma.cc/E9C6R4BK].P5QK-9BZR]. Mohd Javaid et al., Sensors for Daily Life: A Review, SENSORS INTERNATIONAL (July 19, 2021),
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sintl.2021.100121 [https://perma.cc/7EGW-UFAT].
13
Martin Geddes, The Future of Everything: Making Sense of the Sensor Revolution from a Telecoms Perspective, IEEE INTERNET
THINGS (July 12, 2016), https://iot.ieee.org/newsletter/july-2016/the-future-of-everything-making-sense-of-the-sensorrevolution-from-a-telecoms-perspective.html [https://perma.cc/WV4C-86LA].

OF
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sensors first gather data, which is then processed in a computing system that will very quickly provide
near-immediate feedback to a human decision maker. The synergy driving the concept is the
combination of continual data feeds with machine learning, which is expected to improve prediction
of behavior or events in real-time.14 For example, police departments use body cameras today, but tapes
are usually viewed when the need to download and review an event occurs. But bodycams may soon
be able to provide real-time feedback to on-duty officers by using sophisticated facial recognition
software to identify individuals within the officer’s vision—even in a crowd.15 When the system
matches a face with a suspect or missing person in a database it conveys this information to officers
who can decide whether to stop a person walking down the street. 16
Smart dust is another specific technological example of sensors, data, and automated decision
making that can be embedded and closely connected with individuals. 17 The term “smart dust” was
coined in the 1990s by a professor at the University of California, Berkeley, to describe a research
project for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency that had the goal to create a micro-sized
sensor that included communication functionality. 18 Thus, the concept of smart dust, a sensor literally
the size of dust that includes computing capacity and even perhaps a camera has been on the radar of
legal scholars for a number of years.19 Smart dust might also be considered a subset of nanotechnology,
which has long been envisioned as a potential answer for many applications. For example, health care
monitoring by nanotechnology applications are envisioned to move throughout the body and
communicate health information and status.20 Potential uses for smart dust, or motes, as it is also
called,21 are all-encompassing, and could monitor “anything that can be measured nearly everywhere.” 22
While there were barriers to the commercialization of smart dust in the past, in recognition
of its progress, in 2017 Gartner Research placed it on the radar of innovative technologies with
14

The promise of “[t]his ‘hypersense’ revolution is big enough that you can make a good case that ‘cognitive’ is the
new ‘mobile’,” because “[t]he ability to make sense of the ‘hypersense’ world enables new forms of contextual computing and
communications. The machines can increasingly initiate action in the world on behalf of people. This is a collective phenomenon
akin to the arrival of the Web in the 1990s. We might call it the ‘Decision Matrix.’” Id.
15
See Shibani Mahtani & Zusha Elinson, Artificial Intelligence Could Soon Enhance Real-Time Police Surveillance, WALL ST. J.,
(Apr.
4,
2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/artificial-intelligence-could-soon-enhance-real-time-police-surveillance1522761813 [https://perma.cc/Z7UP-N37P].
16

Id.

17

Because neutral dust would require operation and installation within the brain, it is beyond the scope of this article
but deserves a mention. See generally Elise Ackerman, How Smart Dust Could be Used to Monitor Human Thought, FORBES (July 18,
2013, 1:12 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/eliseackerman/2013/07/19/how-smart-dust-could-be-used-to-monitorhuman-thought/#4bc8f2a27ebf [https://perma.cc/2Y83-E8QV] (describing the potential uses of neural dust).
18

Rubin, supra note 3, at 342–43 (describing the history of smart dust development).

19

Smart dust research began in the 1990s at the Universirt of California Berkeley. Id. at 342. See A. Michael Froomkin,
Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: Learning From Environmental Impact Statements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1719 (2015);
A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1538 (2000); Rubin, supra note 3, at 351; Kevin Werbach,
Sensors and Sensibilities, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2321, 2329 (2007).
20
See Janet Brewer & Ogan Gurel, Nanomedicine: Issues of Privacy and Informed Consent, 6 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS.
45, 46 (2009).
21
Bernard Marr, Smart Dust is Coming. Are You Ready?, FORBES (Sept. 16, 2018, 11:52 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/09/16/smart-dust-is-coming-are-you-ready/#169a4c2a5e41
[perma.cc/2ASE-A3N8].
22

Id.

120

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol25/iss2/2

CRITICAL PROTECTION FOR THE NETWORK OF PERSONS
mainstream adoption predicted in 10 years.23 Others also name it as one of the next most disruptive
technologies, predicting that “the advent of smart dust will see the distribution of billions or trillions
of devices, each capable of transmitting specific feedback. . . .”24 Smart dust has a good chance of being
part of the not-too-distant future environment in which individuals are almost continually subjects of
data collection, and sensors collecting the data can do so at an individually and virtually invisible level.
Another example to illustrate the very intimate connection of devices and persons is digital
twins technology.25 Called the “Digital Twin of the Person” when applied to people, it is a technology
on the rise, as predicted by the 2020 Gartner Hype Cycle for Emerging Technologies. 26 Using dynamic
data collection, a “digital twin” of a person—a simulated and constantly updated digital version of the
actual person—is created virtually.27 Creating a digital twin of an individual by collecting and combining
23
See Press Release, Gartner, Gartner Identifies Three Megatrends That Will Drive Digital Business Into the Next
Decade (Aug. 15, 2017); see also Ami Marketing, What in the World is Smart Dust?, AMI (Oct. 3, 2017), https://ami.com/en/techblog/what-in-the-world-is-smart-dust [https://perma.cc/J9ZG-VEGB]

(confirming the promises and potential application of smart dust); Devin Coldewey, IBM Working on ‘World’s Smallest Computer’ to
Attach to Just About Everything, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 19, 2018, 4:15 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/03/19/ibm-working-onworlds-smallest-computer-to-attach-to-just-about-everything [https://perma.cc/9E72-MHAT] (giving an example of one
potential application of smart dust).
24
Tim Fryer,
20
Technologies to Change the
World, E&T MAG. (Sept.
22, 2017),
https://eandt.theiet.org/content/articles/2017/09/20-technologies-to-change-the-world [https://perma.cc/J3N4-Z7YN].
25
“While the concept has been floated for years, it is only since the introduction of IoT—and all the sensors,
networking, and Big Data that may be included—that the Digital Twin has become a financially viable concept to implement.”
Charlie Osborne, Digital Twin Initiatives Set to Take Enterprise Center Stage: Gartner, ZD NET (Mar. 13, 2018),
http://www.zdnet.com/article/digital-twin-initiatives-set-to-take-center-stage-in-the-enterprise-gartner
[https://perma.cc/RNW6-8LF9]; see also Daniel Newman, Digital Twins: The Business Imperative You Might Not Know About, FORBES
(May 30, 2017, 11:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielnewman/2017/05/30/digital-twins-the-business-imperativeyou-might-not-know-about/#12052a0693c3 [https://perma.cc/W49N-T43W] (explaining how digital twins can benefit
collaborations within an enterprise).
26
Kasey Panetta, 5 Trends Drive the Gartner Hype Cycle for Emerging Technologies, 2020, GARTNER (Mar. 8, 2021),
https://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/5-trends-drive-the-gartner-hype-cycle-for-emerging-technologies-2020
[https://perma.cc/TV8X-A9EH].
27

“Whenever [the] physical world changes, a physical sensor tries to update the current status to its digital twin
representative in the cloud. Every physical thing and its corresponding cyber thing manages a Data Store. Every physical or cyber
thing is identified by a unique ID (i.e. IPv6, Universal Product Code (UPC), Electronic Product Code (EPC), etc.) and is aware
of the existence of its twin counterpart.” Kazi Masudul Alam & Abdulmotaleb El Saddik, C2PS: A Digital Twin Architecture Reference
Model for the Cloud-Based Cyber-Physical Systems, 5 IEEE ACCESS 2050, 2053 (2017). See also Christian Sarkar, “Digital Twins, IoT, and
the Future of Business” —An Interview with Sanjay Sarma, THE MKTG. J. (Apr. 25, 2017), http://www.marketingjournal.org/digitaltwins-iot-business-sanjay-sarma [https://perma.cc/N3KY-PU9Y] (explaining the potential effect digital twin can have on the
business world). The reason for creating a digital twin of a physical object is usually to model future performance and apply
predictive analytics to inform decisions about the object related to efficiency, maintenance, or replacement. Development is
advanced for industrial systems. General Electric is well known for its digital twin product for industrial systems, with over
500,000 in use today; it describes them as a progression towards “symbioses between human minds and machines.” Roberto
Saracco,
The
Rise
of
Digital
Twins,
IEEE
FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
(Jan.
16,
2018),
http://sites.ieee.org/futuredirections/2018/01/16/the-rise-of-digital-twins [https://perma.cc/D9WQ-ARQR]; see also
Osborne, supra note 25 (“Gartner revealed the results of a survey [] which suggests that 48 percent of companies which are
already enjoying the benefits of IoT are using, or plan to use Digital Twin by the end of 2018.”). The use of digital twins is also
proposed for use in Smart Cities to manage and predict system functions. See Alam & El Saddik, supra note 27, at 2050 (explaining
that “physical systems act as the sensors to collect real-world information and communicate them to the computation modules
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very personal information can be used, for example, to predict illness and for medical treatment. 28 Retail
industries are not far away from using digital twins to create a replica of each consumer, using both
purchase and non-purchase data in order to make predictions about individual consumer behavior in
order to “cross-sell and up-sell.”29
In 2017, Deloitte explained that as applied to physical assets, “[t]he digital twin is based on
massive, cumulative, real-time, real-world data measurements across an array of dimensions.” 30 It is not
hard to see that it would be a relatively small step for the data from wearables and smart dust to be fed
into a multi-use digital twin of an individual.31 Massive and real-time data collection about a person may
be the foundation of Facebook’s metamorphosis in 2021 into a company called Meta, which it premised
on a future of an “embodied internet.”32
Decisional uses of technology such as real-time police bodycam systems, smart dust, digital
twins, and the like, fall into the broader category of cognitive computing, augmented reality, machine
learning, or deep learning that can all be considered to fall under the general umbrella of artificial
intelligence.33 The illustrative technologies are exemplary of a pervasive environment of individuallybased data collection and analysis. The data collected by sensors is transferred, usually through the
Internet, to computing systems that can make sense of large datasets and can combine sensor data with
additional datasets. Finally, automated systems will create predictions, shared at some level with
(i.e. cyber layer), which further analyze and notify the findings to the corresponding physical systems through a feedback loop.”).
28

See Koen Bruynseels et al., Digital Twins in Health Care: Ethical Implications of an Emerging Engineering Paradigm, 9
FRONTIERS GENETICS 1, 3 (2018) (stating that “[t]he emerging data-driven personalized health care practices bear striking
resemblances to Digital Twins driven engineering in industry.”). See generally Min Chen et al., Smart Clothing: Connecting Human with
Clouds and Big Data for Sustainable Health Monitoring, 21 MOBILE NETWORKS & APPLICATIONS 825 (2016) (describing how data
collected through smart clothing and other technologies can allow people to better recognize health issues and resolve them
more quickly).
29
Todd Hassell, How ‘Digital Twins’ Nurture the Customer Experience, FORBES (Jan. 11, 2018, 8:16 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sap/2018/01/11/how-digital-twins-nurture-the-customer-experience/
[https://perma.cc/7NT4-MVF8].
30
Aaron Parrott & Lane Warshaw, Industry 4.0 and the Digital Twin, Deloitte (May 12, 2017),
https://www.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/focus/industry-4-0/digital-twin-technology-smart-factory [https://perma.cc/S6LFPQ66].
31

See Macy Bayern, Let’s Get Phygital: Most Disruptive Tech of 2020, TECHREPUBLIC (Nov. 11, 2019, 12:00 PM),
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/lets-get-phygital-data-automation-and-iot-lead-the-way-in-disruptive-tech
[https://perma.cc/3YN3-KJNK] (“As internet of things (IoT) devices continue advancing, from sensors to wearables and
smartphones, more data points about humans will be collected. Humans will generate enough data to create a digital twin. . . .”);
see also Diane J. Cook & Narayanan Krishnan, Mining the Home Environment, 43 J. INTELL. INFO. SYS. 503 (2014) (describing types
of smart home monitoring sensors, data mining algorithms and uses, and privacy and security challenges).
32
Kevin Kruse, The Metaverse, Digital Twins, and Leadership Development, FORBES (Nov. 4, 2021),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kevinkruse/2021/11/04/the-metaverse-digital-twins-and-leadershipdevelopment/?sh=63a8a9186287 [https://perma.cc/2DUV-LFNM] (“[B]efore there can be a true metaverse—enterprise or
otherwise—there must first be ‘digital twins’.”).
33
NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE, 6–11 (2016) (stating that “There is no single definition of AI [Artificial Intelligence] that is universally accepted
by practitioners.” Id. at 6); see also Andy Meek, Connecting Artificial Intelligence with the Internet of Things, THE GUARDIAN (July 24,
2015,
7:11
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/24/artificial-intelligence-internet-of-things
[https://perma.cc/3F9N-AG5K].
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decision makers, or instituted in an automated decision-making process, based on the data and analysis.
The impact is that:
[These] computing systems redefine the nature of the relationship between people
and their increasingly pervasive digital environment. They may play the role of
assistant or coach for the user, and they may act virtually autonomously in many
problem-solving situations. The boundaries of the processes and domains these
systems will affect are still elastic and emergent.34
In summary, the personally connective system is not science fiction. As technology becomes
available to connect any number of identified, specific persons at a granular level, and as these form
networks that allow for further communication, persons will be the target for threats and vulnerabilities
in ways not previously imagined and at exponentially higher levels. Thus, the security of the personally
connective system raise many legal, ethical, and social issues, discussed in the following parts.
The elements of the system described in general in Part I. A. include a hypersensed
environment consisting of the sensored and connected person, large amounts of data collected to make
predictions about individuals, and the technological means of closing the data loop with decision
making. The following section describes an earlier effort by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) to create a systems approach to describe the interlocking parts and processes in a
network as it applies to things. Part I. C. will extend the NIST model to include the personal sensoring
described here.
B. The NIST Systems Model
In 2016, NIST issued a publication entitled ‘Networks of ‘Things.’” 35 The goal of the
publication was to create a vocabulary for discussing the commonly referred to IoT, smart systems, or
whatever name is used for a distributed system that communicates via the Internet or another medium
that transmits data.36 Acknowledging that “[no] simple, actionable, and universally-accepted definition
for IoT exists,” it nonetheless identified that “[t]he tethering factor [connecting converging
technologies] is data.”37 The NIST vocabulary and descriptive model provides a common
understanding of the basics of a sensored world, how it “behaves,” and how such a system relates to
the creation of trust.38 Applying a simplified model, but building upon the NIST work, a definition of
a Network of Things (NoT) can be described as consisting of five elements: 1) sensors, 2) aggregators,
3) a communication channel, 4) external or e-utilities, and 5) decision triggers.39
34
Sue Feldmen & Hadley Reynolds, Cognitive computing: A definition and some thoughts, KM WORLD,
https://www.kmworld.com/Articles/News/News-Analysis/Cognitive-computing-A-definition-and-some-thoughts99956.aspx. [https://perma.cc/XF5K-UBC6]
35
Jeffrey Voas, NETWORKS OF ‘THINGS’ 1 NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH (2016) (NIST uses the acronyms IoT
(Internet of Things) and NoT (Network of Things) interchangeably but notes that “IoT is an instantiation of a NoT,” Network
of “ThingsSTANDARDS & TECH., “).
36

Id. at 1 (as such the NIST definition of NoT includes but is not limited to the IoT).

37

Id.

38

Id. NIST decided that it is the behavior that matters, rather than an explicit definition.

39

Id. at 2.
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According to NIST, the sensor elements of a NoT are: a sensor with a physical presence, it
may be connected to the Internet, and its product is data. 40 Furthermore, sensors may or may not
perform identification functions, the data that they transmit may or may not be accurate, and the data
may be shared with any number of networks. 41 NIST identifies security as a potential concern for
sensors, but suggests that security is only necessary under certain circumstances. 42 Particularly relevant
to our discussion of security for a sensored network that evolves around persons, humans are described
as possible threats to sensor reliability because they may fail to follow policy, misread data, or misplace
sensors.43
While sensors produce the data, the aggregator component is defined as the software that
processes that raw data, thus making “big data” usable.44 Security and reliability of the aggregator
software is a concern, as it may be hacked, blocked, or misled by incorrect data. 45 Next, the
communication channel is the transportation layer, moving the data “from intermediate events at
different snapshots in time.”46 The Internet, or wireless communication, is likely to be the
communication channel. However, a mesh network could allow communications directly between
sensors.47 Communication channels can also be attacked or slowed, and their reliability and security are
concerns. Next, an e-utility is defined as a “software or hardware product or service.”48 Other standardsetting bodies have named this part of the system as being comprised of “cyber-entities,” or “digital
entities.”49 These entities “execute processes or feed data into the overall workflow.” 50 Interestingly,
NIST classifies a human as a possible e-utility.51 If an e-utility is not human, it may still have a unique
ID. Although NIST did not explicitly recognize this fact, we argue that an e-utility that has a unique ID
may be so closely connected to an individual that, in many ways related to data collection, it serves
similar functions.52 Both reliability and security continue to be issues for the e-utility.53
The final element of the NoT is the decision trigger(s). NIST describes this element as an “ifthen” function that “define[s] the end-purpose” of the NoT and “can control actuators and
transactions.”54 For example, a decision trigger might be part of a smart city infrastructure that monitors
40

NIST describes twenty-nine attributes of a sensor. Id. at 2–4.

41

Id.

42

Id. at 3-4.

43

Id. at 4.

44

Id.

45

Id. at 5.

46

Id. at 7.

47

See Swaroop Poudel, Internet of Things: Underlying Technologies, Interoperability, and Threats to Privacy and Security, 31
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 997, 1005 (2016) (stating that “[i]n a mesh network, devices connect directly with one another to relay
information, enabling the network to sprawl over a wide area even though a single device may transmit only up to 300 feet.”).
48

Voas, supra note 34, at 9.

49

Id. at n.3.

50

Id. at 9.

51

Id. at 10.

52

See infra Part II.B.

53

See Voas, supra note 34, at 11-13.

54

Id. at 11-13. Andrea Matwyshyn analyzes a similar, but distinct, infrastructure that she names the “Internet of Bodies,”
that not only uses sensors but that is also uniquely embedded into human bodies. Andrea M. Matwyshyn, The Internet of Bodies, 61
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air quality: sensors collect air quality data that is aggregated across a geographical area, and if software
(the e-utility) determines that the air quality reaches an unacceptable point, then the decision trigger
might be programmed to close city streets to further traffic.
The following chart summarizes each element of the NoT, and gives a basic example:
NIST NoT

Example

Sensors

Collect data

Car maintenance data collected by onboard computer;
apps in car; mobile phone apps

Aggregators

Process data from multiple
sources and times

Car manufacturers or their business associates

Communication

Network(s) that transfer data

Internet; proprietary network

External/EUtilities

Products or services that use data
for particular purpose

Navigation services; emergency crash response; roadside
assistance

Decision Trigger

Action taken as result of data
collection and processing: an ifthen process.

Data from car indicates that both tire pressure is low
and the car has missed its last service; location indicates
a dealer is close by; message sent to driver with address
of dealer

Channel

C. Modifying the NIST Model for the NoP
We propose an update to the NoT that identifies a person-level sensoring environment,
naming this the Network of Persons (NoP). The NoP building blocks are interconnected persons based
on 1) targeting of individuals, 2) collecting and processing data, and 3) triggering decisions about a
person based on the data. Like the NIST NoT, this proposed definition recognizes that data fuels the
system. Utilizing the five NIST elements but fine-tuning those definitions, we describe the NoP as
consisting of personally targeted55 sensors, aggregators that operationalize and combine data that is
related to persons, e-utilities that process the data, and triggers of person level decisions. Importantly,
an individual person must be affected by the NoP, but the point in the system at which the person is
affected may vary. The next sections further describe the elements of the proposed NoP.
1. Targeting a Person’s Data: Sensors and Aggregators
Similar to the NIST definition, sensors in the NoP may or may not collect personally
identifying information. Our proposed definition of NoP sensors is that they must either be physically
connected to a person, or be so closely aligned with a person that they are targeting the person’s data.
This definition varies from the NIST approach to a NoT, and it eliminates purely industrial and
WM. & MARY L. REV. 77 (2019).
55

See infra Part I.C. “Personally targeted” is based on the systematic use of external sensors to collect and process
information about the person. This is different from, but can include, the traditionally defined personally identifiable information.
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environmental sensors that collect information unrelated to an individual. It includes sensors that are
physically or proximately connected to a person, such as health related monitors or physical activity
monitors, and it encompasses a broader set of ubiquitous sensors, exemplified by future smart dust,
that are not physically connected to a person but are nonetheless targeted towards sensing data related
to persons.
NIST discussed the reality that a sensor may collect incorrect data and that it may share data
more broadly; these realities are also faced by an NoP sensor—with potentially devastating
consequences. In contrast to the NIST assumption that security is not always a necessity for sensors, it
is proposed that security is, indeed, always needed for NoP sensors, 56 because they are focused on
critical life functions.57
NoP aggregators perform similar functions to aggregators in the NIST model,
operationalizing the person’s data so that it is useful to an e-utility. The proposed model of an IoP
includes the possibility that an aggregator’s processing of nonpersonal data might be combined with
additional data, resulting in the targeting of a specific person. An aggregator, in sum, can process nonattributed data into a form that will be part of a NoP.
NIST explains that security is a problem for aggregators, because they may be hacked or
compromised, or they may process incorrect data.58 These security concerns are amplified in an NoP,
because the sensor data that targets a person, aggregated with other data, can create a new and elevated
threat of harm at the personal level. Coding errors or manipulated data could also cause aggregators to
produce flawed results that would create systematic failures.
2. Connective Tissue: Communication Channels
The various communication channels in the NIST model are the same for an NoP, as the data
will need to be communicated so that it may be transformed, processed, and applied to make decisions.
However, it is important to note an essential component of an NoP: that the location of the
communication network (and the entire system) may one day happen in a physical place that is
connected with, closely allied to, or even part of the person herself. For example, a pacemaker
embedded in a person today is interrogated by means of a monitor, which then communicates
information through an Internet connection to a medical data warehouse.59 Based on this information,
the pacemaker can be recalibrated.60 However, in an NoP, a communication channel does not
necessarily imply a physical distance. It is not difficult to imagine a time when technology will progress
to the point that the entire process of sensing a patient’s interaction with a pacemaker, interpreting the
output, comparing the data to normal functions, and making a decision about the patient will be self56
We acknowledge that security requirements could differ based on different risk factors, as described in the NIST
Cybersecurity Framework. See generally Framework for Improving

Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH. (Apr. 16, 2018),
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VE5-6EME].
57

Which will be discussed in Part II.B.

58

Voas, supra note 34, at 5.

59

Katina Michael, Implantable Medical Device Tells All: Uberveillance Gets to the Heart of the Matter, 6 IEEE CONSUMER ELECS.
MAG., Oct. 2017, at 107, 108.
60

See id. (describing data being retained and the device receiving firmware updates).
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contained in a NoP that is embedded in and executed within the patient’s body.61 In situations such as
those, and as multiple, personally targeted sensors communicate directly with each other, the
communication channel is literally taking place at the level of the person herself. This example shows
the critical importance of a secure NoP for both personal and national safety.
3. Individual Impact: NoP E-utilities and Decision Triggers
In comparison to the NoT, which can, for example, include real time operational inputs to a
machine in a plant, our definition of the NoP e-utilities working with decision triggers processes large
amounts of information in order to make decisions that affect individuals. For example, smart
transportation is one part of an overall push to create sustainable smart cities that collect and use broad
types of citizen data to make decisions about effectively managing services. 62 A 2014 white paper by
the U.S. Department of Transportation described smart cities in this manner:
[S]mart/connected cities contain and use “intelligent infrastructure,” . . . devices and
equipment that can sense the environment and/or their own status, send data, and
often, receive commands. This intelligent infrastructure connects the city’s world of
data with its physical reality, creating data based on the real world and following databased commands to act on the real world as well. . . . [S]mart/connected cities use
new analytical processes that have been facilitated by ICT advances. These include
big data analysis, crowdsourcing to gather data and solve problems, and gamification
to incentivize behaviors and engage the connected citizen.63
This definition of a smart, connected city incorporates the fundamental elements of a NoT: 64
sensors to collect information and feed it into aggregators to process the raw data, 65 communication
channels between multiple points of the network and the world, and e-utilities to process the data and
use it to execute commands according to decision triggers. 66 Many interlocking systems will be required
to achieve this vision, and it is not difficult to anticipate that a good deal of the data, although not all,
will be targeted towards the individual as a driver or passenger, as the USDOT states: “[c]onnected
vehicles and travelers will be able to share data with all sorts of equipment, not only transportationrelated devices and infrastructure.” 67 Sensors will certainly not always target data from persons, for
61
Mark Peyrot & Richard R. Rubin, Patient-Reported Outcomes for an Integrated Real-Time Continuous Glucose Monitoring/Insulin
Pump System, 11 DIABETES TECH. & THERAPEUTICS 57, 57–61 (2009).
62

34 (2017).

See Janine S. Hiller & Jordan M. Blanke, Smart Cities, Big Data, and the Resilience of Privacy, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 323–

63
U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., THE SMART/CONNECTED CITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CONNECTED TRANSPORTATION
1 (2014), https://www.its.dot.gov/itspac/Dec2014/Smart_Connected_City_FINAL_111314.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GNLP3ED].
64

See supra Part I.B.

65

See U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., supra note 62, at 1.

66

See generally Tiffany Fishman & Justine Bornstein, The Rise of Mobility as a Service, DELOITTE INSIGHTS (Jan. 23, 2017),
https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/deloitte-review/issue-20/smart-transportation-technology-mobility-as-aservice.html [https://perma.cc/7VZ2-YPKX] (providing a clear explanation, with example of the elements).
67

U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., supra note 62.
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example they could be limited to only collecting data only about the number of cars on the road. 68
However, based on the USDOT vision to “target . . . probable safety violators”69 and change driver
behavior,70 it is clear there would be infrastructure that targets data from individuals within such a
system; linking mobile phones, smart car identifiers, and other connected devices to a person. 71 If used
generally, and anonymously, an analytics service/product, for example one that manages traffic lights,
would not be part of the NoP. On the other hand, a traffic e-utility might be designed to collect
information for use in a predictive analytics application to track individuals in order to prevent crime;
it would likely process personally-targeted data from transportation-related sensors to predict who is
expected to commit crimes based on who they visit and the times and places they interact. 72 This use
of an e-utility would be part of the NoP because it affects personal freedom of movement and rights
of association that are critically important for citizenship and personhood. A decision trigger might, for
example, be implemented in order to set insurance rates at a higher level if sensors detect that an
individual frequents geographic areas that have high crime rates.
The following chart builds upon the previous NIST NoT description, and shows how each
element is modified in the proposed NoP:
NIST NoT

Proposed NoP

Sensors

Collect data

Data collection targets persons; physically
connected or closely aligned with the person

Aggregators

Process data from multiple sources
and times

Combines data in ways that continue, or
create, targeting of persons

Communication

Network to transfer data

Person is usually, but not always, an element of
the communication channel

External/e-utilities

Products or services that use data for
particular purposes

Product or service relates to an individual

Decision Trigger

Action taken as result of data
collection and processing

Decision/action affects individuals

Channel

Having identified a Network of Persons, Part II outlines threats to and vulnerabilities of the
system. In response to these threats, we propose that critical parts of the NoP deserve heightened
68

Fishman & Bornstein, supra note 65, at 121 (noting that Singapore’s government shares information anonymously
with private sector companies).
69

U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., supra note 62, at 2.

70

Id.

71

See, e.g., Internet of Things, GSMA, https://www.gsma.com/iot/automotive [https://perma.cc/PN76-FQF3]
(describing vehicles connecting with other vehicles, infrastructure, and people) (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
72
See Exec. Off. of the President, Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values 1, 31 (2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UL7G-56G7] (“Controversially, predictive analytics can now be applied to analyze a person’s individual
propensity to criminal activity,” and therefore it “shift[s] the focus of predictive policing from geographical factors to identity.”).
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protection: when data is collected and/or aggregated through the sensors and, as a result, decisions are
made that are applicable to “critical life” functions, the NoP is placed within the types of infrastructure
that have been categorized as critical infrastructure.
II. ENVISIONING A CRITICAL NOP
In light of forthcoming technology on one hand, and growing technological disruption on the
other, critical infrastructure protection is a priority, not only for the United States, but for security
policy makers in developed economies around the world.73 Assessing the nexus of critical infrastructure
and identifying those areas where rights and national security concerns intertwine indicates areas where
global standards or norms might be developed. By focusing on the subject, i.e. the person, at the center
of the infrastructure the human importance is interwoven with the technical application. Below we
establish the life-critical functions of the subject, the technical infrastructure upon which they depend,
the vulnerabilities embedded in both, the relationship between the subject and the technology, and the
logic for critical protection that the relationship necessitates.
A. Threats, Vulnerabilities, and National Security
It is increasingly difficult to disaggregate the human-digital relationship. As the relationship
between persons and the digital world deepens, digital and human rights violations are likely to increase
both in volume and severity. The result is that persons will be subject to threats, both materially and
cognitively, for which they have no individual defense.74 The imbalance between individual interactions
within the digital ecosystem, and their ability to maintain their security in the face of criminal and state
interference is well-documented. Report after report demonstrates that criminal entities, private
enterprise, and state entities collaborate to undermine the fundamental privacy and security of devices
used by individuals, threatening journalists, human rights activists, and the average citizen. 75 The
73
See also Jing de Jong-Chen & Bobby O’Brien, A Comparative Study: The Approach to Critical Infrastructure Protection in the
U.S.,
E.U.,
and
China,
WILSON
CENTER,
11
(Nov.
2017),
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/approach_to_critical_infrastructure_protecti
on.pdf [https://perma.cc/C98X-TBFK] (recommending global collaboration to protect critical infrastructure). See generally
Cybersecurity Policy Making at a Turning Point: Analysing a New Generation of National Cybersecurity Strategies for the Internet Economy, OECD
(2012).
74
Aaron Franklin Brantly, The Cyber Losers, 10 DEMOCRACY & SEC. 132, 142–43 (2014) (arguing that the development
ever advanced cybersecurity technologies by nation-state actors substantially disadvantage individual citizens and consequently
expose them to increasing levels of risk).
75

See generally, e.g., Jeffrey Knockel et al., We Chat, They Watch: How International Users Unwittingly Build up WeChat’s Chinese
Censorship Apparatus, CITIZEN LAB (May 7, 2020), https://citizenlab.ca/2020/05/we-chat-they-watch [https://perma.cc/5MEBYBTJ]; Christopher Parsons et al., The Predator in Your Pocket: A Multidisciplinary Assessment of the Stalkerware Application Industry,
CITIZEN LAB (June 12, 2019), https://citizenlab.ca/2019/06/the-predator-in-your-pocket-a-multidisciplinary-assessment-ofthe-stalkerware-application-industry [https://perma.cc/JJ7F-CNR7]; John Scott-Railton et al., Reckless VI: Mexican Journalists
Investigating Cartels Targeted with NSO Spyware Following Assassination of Colleague, CITIZEN LAB (Nov. 27, 2018),
https://citizenlab.ca/2018/11/mexican-journalists-investigating-cartels-targeted-nso-spyware-following-assassination-colleague
[https://perma.cc/4RC5-ECFG]; Geoffrey Alexander et al., Familiar Feeling: A Malware Campaign Targeting the Tibetan Diaspora
Resurfaces, CITIZEN LAB (Aug. 8, 2018), https://citizenlab.ca/2018/08/familiar-feeling-a-malware-campaign-targeting-thetibetan-diaspora-resurfaces [https://perma.cc/PCA6-SPML].
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proliferation and diversification of sensors in ways such as smart dust, digital twins, and future
technologies portend a groundbreaking shift in the separation of the individual from the collective; the
digital from the non-digital. Even today, it is nearly impossible for the citizenry of most developed, and
many developing, nations to live their daily lives without generating data exhaust that is commoditized
and used to shape behaviors.76
The diverse landscape of vulnerabilities and threats to individuals within cyberspace, both as
autonomous agents and participants in larger networked environments, makes clear the national
security implications resident within the NoP. One way to address these concerns is through critical
infrastructure protection. In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the USA Patriot Act created a
statutory basis for critical infrastructure protection, 77 defined as “sectors that compose the assets,
systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation
or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public
health or safety, or any combination thereof.” 78 The conditions that make critical infrastructures
particularly susceptible to disruption include: a broad range of potential attacks, interconnectivity of
sectors, high density of targets, and inadequate security79 are also present in the NoP. Different levels
of data collection, processing, and decision triggers in the NoP provide various points for attack. Eutilities are a means to join interconnected systems, and aggregators by their nature increase the density
of data to be targeted and consequently enhance the rewards associated with successful attacks.
Personally connective IoT devices continue to proliferate without adequate security and are likely to do
so for the foreseeable future. A 2018 General Accounting Office (GAO) report indicates that cyber
attacks could be weaponized, and it identifies attacks on personal health information as an example,
stating: “Adversaries could also launch cyber attacks on the U.S. health care system, threatening patient
safety by disrupting access to medical care.”80 The identification of this threat is more chilling when
combined with the facts that aggregate health care data is increasingly collected through patient sensors
and combined with ubiquitous lifestyle information, 81 and that 2018 was a record year for administrative
enforcement actions due to health data breaches. 82 The disruption of citizen health is certainly a national
security problem, as the COVID-19 pandemic so recently brings to bear.83
76
SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW
FRONTIER OF POWER 130–38 (2019) (engaging in a process of behavioral surplus accumulation. This accumulation shifts
individuals from economies of scale to economies of action, in which consumer behaviors are shaped).
77
Even before the 9/11 attacks, Presidential Directives addressed protection of critical infrastructure following terrorist
attacks. See Joe D. Whitley et al., Homeland Security, Law, and Policy Through the Lens of Critical Infrastructure and Key Asset Protection, 47
JURIMETRICS 259, 261–63 (2007) (reviewing a series of Presidential directives and Homeland Security directives between 1996
and 2003).
78

Id. at 260.

79

Whitley, et al. identifies these conditions as key vulnerabilities. See ZUBOFF, supra note 75, at 268–71.

80

U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES: NATIONAL SECURITY: LONGRANGE THREATS FACING THE UNITED STATES AS IDENTIFIED BY FEDERAL AGENCIES, 9 (Dec. 2018),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695981.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQS4-UWDJ].
81

See Hiller, supra note 11, at 268-277 (describing the cascade of health data from various sources).
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Carlton Fields, 2018 Was A Record Year in HIPAA Enforcement, JD SUPRA (Feb. 18, 2019),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/2018-was-a-record-year-in-hipaa-67308 [https://perma.cc/A4HT-RQHT].
83

Lily Hay Newman, The Covid-19 Pandemic Reveals Ransomware’s Long Game, WIRED (Apr. 20, 2020),

https://www.wired.com/story/covid-19-pandemic-ransomware-long-game
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The exclusion of the individual from critical infrastructure is in direct opposition to data
indicating that individuals are often both the unwitting victims and perpetrators of nearly all cyber
intrusions.84 The inability to secure the individual within the digital ecosystem constitutes a recurrent
and lasting vulnerability. While multinational corporations, governments, and large existing critical
infrastructure providers can in many instances purchase high-end cyberdefensive services, individual
citizens are wholly unable to do so at this necessary level.85 A nation that does not secure this ubiquitous
infrastructure from external interference and internal malpractice will be subject to economic instability,
political opaqueness, citizen distrust, and the destruction of individual agency.
This is the challenge faced by the NoP framework. In a world in which the proliferation of
connective technology pervades every aspect of a person’s life, the recognition that the unit of analysis
needs to be lowered to the individual level compels a reconceptualization of the role of the state as the
guarantor of defense, and new legal and regulatory frameworks. Where once bullets and bombs crossing
borders were the principal concern of states, bits and bytes are added to this dynamic in a manner that
impacts the safety, security, and stability of societies and their citizens.
B. Life Critical Data and Functions
Advances in technologies that intertwine human subjects and computational devices and
sensors necessitate the development of an independent category within critical infrastructure
protection. Instead of the NIST approach of categorizing a human as a potential security flaw in the
infrastructure mentioned in Part I. B., or an entity that is only a user of the data (the e-utility), in the
NoP the individual is constitutive of the connective tissue of the infrastructure itself, because of the
intimate connection of sensors, data from the sensors, and decision making based on those sensors, all
fundamentally connected to human existence. So as not to identify every data point as part of the NoP
infrastructure, however, we propose that the critical NoP (CNoP) be defined as when the data collected
and/or aggregated through the sensors, or decision made as a result thereof, are applicable to “life
critical” functions.86
Computer software designers consider a program to be life critical by answering the question,
“[i]f it fails, will someone die?”87 Examples included the failure of software that runs autopilot for an
airplane, and a defect in the software that guides self-driving cars. We propose a definition of life critical
NoP functions that is inclusive of, but broader than, the computer science use of the term, recognizing
Brantly, The Cybersecurity of Health, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/blog/cybersecurityhealth, [https://perma.cc/5WG2-ECY8].
84

See X-Force Threat Intelligence Index, IBM X-FORCE INCIDENT RESPONSE AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (IRIS) (2020),
https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/DEDOLR3W [https://perma.cc/S6HC-H4PX].
85
See generally Lennart Maschmeyer et al., A Tale of Two Cybers—How Threat Reporting by Cybersecurity Firms Systematically
Underrepresents Threats to Civil Society, 17 J. INFO. TECH. & POL. 1 (2020).
86
On the term “life critical,” see generally WORKING GROUP, SECURITY TENETS FOR LIFE CRITICAL EMBEDDED
SYSTEMS (U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. 2015), https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/security-tenets-lcespaper-11-20-15-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/882E-HHV9].
87
Debates about software reliability for life-critical applications are not new. See, e.g., Ricky W. Butler & George B.
Finelli, The Infeasibility of Quantifying the Reliability of Life-Critical Real-Time Software, 19 IEEE TRANSACTIONS SOFTWARE ENG’G 3
(1993) (proposing that describing “software reliability is meaningless—software is either correct or incorrect with respect to its
specification.”).
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that life critical failures can be insidious, as well as catastrophic. The focus is not exclusively on
personally identifiable data in the NoP, although it is one factor that can contribute to a system being
linked to a life critical function. Neither is the focus about whether an individual gave consent to the
collection of the information; within a CNoP it is highly unlikely that individuals even know whether
the information is being collected. Instead, the focus here centers on whether the NoP affects critical
life functions, deserving enhanced protection from threats and vulnerabilities. 88
Recognizing that categories may overlap,89 we propose that life critical NoP functions be
defined as those that affect fundamental rights and obligations in three areas: citizenship, economic
necessities, and personhood. Critical citizenship functions include voting, political speech, and other
recognized fundamental rights. While the U.S. and other countries’ constitutions are obviously essential
to protecting fundamental, critical rights of citizens, the sobering fact is that they are insufficient to
secure life critical functions in a NoP. Constitutional protections are often enforced ex post, 90 but
protecting the NoP as critical infrastructure seeks to protect citizenship rights ex ante. 91 Furthermore,
normally the operation of a NoP will be opaque, therefore making ex post citizen enforcement of rights
through legal remedies difficult.92 Life critical citizenship functions also go beyond the negative rights
imbued in the Constitution and include those that affect fundamental citizen decision-making within a
democracy; this includes NoP activities that can negatively affect governmental transparency, 93 due
process,94 and ultimately, on a broad scale, diminish citizen trust.
88
It should be noted that we do not mean to imply that other aspects of surveillance should not be otherwise regulated
or certified, but the focus in this paper is limited to the life critical functions that would categorize the infrastructure as critical to
national well-being and security. We also recognize that the definition of life critical functions will require further development,
and could be related to human rights jurisprudence. That conversation is beyond the scope of this article, although it is suggested
for future research.
89

See Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 159, 165 (2015) (noting, “The emphasis on dignity
and autonomy within the informational privacy context has distracted courts from informational privacy’s more limited
underlying interests—the protection of intimate information and political thought.”). See generally Yael Braudo-Bahat, Towards a
Relational Conceptualization of the Right to Personal Autonomy, 25 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & LAW 111, 115–17 (2017) (reviewing
liberal meanings of autonomy); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 876 (1994) (discussing the
different meanings of autonomy and noting the argument that “autonomy of speech and thought as necessary for legitimate
government”).
90
See Mila Versteeg, The Politics of Takings Clauses, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 695 (2015) (referring to the effectiveness of
constitutional anti-takings clauses, and noting that “mechanisms that are supposed to make it harder to deviate from the
constitution’s promises ex post” can sometimes fail).
91
Ex-ante protection being an essential tenant of Preventive and Proactive Law (PPL). See Gerlinde Berger-Walliser et
al., From Visualization to Legal Design: A Collaborative and Creative Process, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 347, 364 (2017) (distinguishing PPL from
traditional adversary law).
92
See Emily Berman, A Government of Laws and Not Machines, 98 B.U. L. Rev. 1277, 1322 (2018) (discussing opaqueness
as a particular problem for security and law enforcement).
93

Id.at 1321.

94

Legal scholarship that analyzes the effect of governmental used algorithms on due process rights is relevant, and
addresses one part of the IoP infrastructure, decision making. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1249, 1256-58 (2008); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89
WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 5–6, 18–20 (2014); Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress
Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 94–101, 121–28 (2014); Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L.
REV. 633, 640, 656 (2017).
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Life critical economic necessities encompass, at a minimum, 95 the non-discriminatory
employment relationship that underlies a person’s ability to earn a living, as reflected in the employment
laws that guarantee the right of individuals to engage in non-discriminatory employment
opportunities,96 and access to government support such as employment laws that protect individuals
from discriminatory treatment. Yet, the vulnerabilities of employment facing NoP systems could
invidiously undermine these rights and poison the market for human capital.
Personhood includes those fundamental rights beyond political citizenship, including
autonomy and self-definition. The concept of personhood is closely related to autonomy and the right
of an individual to make critical life choices. Autonomy is a recognized, ethical, principle in health care,
for example, found in the patient’s right to choose treatment options and to make end-of-life
decisions.97
Applying this concept to the elements of the infrastructure, an e-utility will be a part of the
CNoP when it applies a product or service to a critical life function. An example of an e-utility that
affects the life critical function of economic necessities would be an employment algorithm that
incorporates data collected from where people travel, where they live, how they exercise, and perhaps
even what they eat.98 Human resource professionals have long sought objective ways to make effective,
non-discriminatory employment decisions.99 In recent years, employers and consultants have started
incorporating larger sets of data and analytics methods into employment decision-making.100 As applied
95
Economic rights are found more broadly in international documents, yet the adoption of these rights is not consistent
worldwide. See generally Steven A. Ramirez, Taking Economic Human Rights Seriously After the Debt Crisis, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 713,
715 (2011) (“Economic human rights include, among other rights, the right to be free from discrimination, the right to a basic
education, the right to advanced education based upon merit, the right of laborers to pursue collective bargaining, and the right
to decent health care and living conditions.”). Statutory action may be needed to expand employment rights beyond nondiscrimination. Therefore, we leave the question of how far economic rights should extend to another discussion, focusing on
the established rights of non-discrimination.
96
See generally Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016); Pauline T.
Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857 (2017).
97
See Erin Sheley, Rethinking Injury: The Case of Informed Consent, 2015 BYU L. REV. 63, 69–73 (2015) (proposing that
informational privacy rights promote the relationship between two premises of medical ethics; autonomy and beneficence,
applied to informed consent).
98
Te-Ping Chen, Your Company Wants to Know if You’ve Lost Weight, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2019, 11:28 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/does-your-company-need-to-know-your-body-mass-index-11549902536 [ https://perma.cc/
KYH3-RR7E].
99
See also Alec Levenson, The Promise of Big Data for HR, 36 PEOPLE & STRATEGY 22 (2014) (focusing on the experiences
of employees once hired). See generally Big Data in the Workplace: Examining Implications for Equal Employment Opportunity Law, Meeting
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Oct. 13, 2016) [hereinafter Trindel] (statement of Dr. Kelly Trindel, Chief
Analyst, Office of Research, Information, and Planning, EEOC), available at https://www.eeoc.gov/meetings/meeting-october13-2016-big-data-workplace-examining-implications-equal-employment/trindel%2C%20phd
[https://perma.cc/S5G7-436J]
(outlining the opportunities and future concerns for the use of big tech in employment decision making); Use of Big Data Has
Implications for Equal Employment Opportunity, Panel Tells EEOC, EEOC (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/usebig-data-has-implications-equal-employment-opportunity-panel-tells-eeoc [https://perma.cc/6S4S-W6AC] (highlighting the
potential and the problems with big data in the employment context).
100
Mark Feffer, HR Moves Toward Wider Use of Predictive Analytics SHRM (Oct. 6, 2014),
https://www.shrm.org/ResourcesAndTools/hr-topics/technology/Pages/More-HR-Pros-Using-Predictive-Analytics.aspx
[https://perma.cc/5RKS-7D7W]. For a broad description of applications and explanation of terminology, see Predictive Analytics:
What it is and why it matters, SAS https://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/analytics/predictive-analytics.html (last visited Nov. 1,
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to employment-related decision making, the EEOC Office of Research describes such a process as “the
combination of nontraditional and traditional employment data with technology-enabled analytics to
create processes for identifying, recruiting, segmenting, and scoring job candidates and employees.” 101
Sometimes called “people analytics,” companies’ human resources departments already use data that is
collected outside of the workplace to make employment decisions. 102 Multiple sensors that are either
worn by or closely connected to employees, collecting and processing information to use in
employment contexts, triggering employment decisions, will affect a person’s ability to earn a livelihood,
and even on a broader scale could affect national security by causing market disruption in the
workforce. The utilization of machine learning and artificial intelligence has been demonstrated in
numerous instances to result in negative externalities on everything from employment decisions to
decisions pertaining to parole and the location of businesses within communities. 103 Further concerns
include the intersection of health management and care as the proliferation of patient data allows
insurance companies, employers, and care providers to maximize efficiency, at times at the expense of
the human subject.104
While many negative externalities of decision triggers may be unintentionally programmed in,
it is also possible to manipulate them to achieve directed effects. Two principal examples serve to
illustrate the potential impact of such manipulations. The first incident occurred in 2013, when the
Syrian Electronic Army hacked the AP News Twitter account and posted that President Obama had
been injured in a terrorist bombing of the White House.105 The result of the attack was a precipitous
$136 billion decline in the stock market as algorithms immediately responded to the news and began a
mass sell-off.106 The second case is Russia’s deliberate manipulation of social media algorithms to foster
a robust disinformation campaign that reached more than 120 million Americans in the lead up to the
2016 presidential elections.107 These well-known examples of terrorist and nation state activities to
discredit targeted individuals are intended to escalate disruption of an entire industry or country’s
economic or political system.
Thus, the vulnerabilities faced within the NoP will impact both the critical life functions of
the individual, as well as the society at large. In complex digitally and socially networked environments,
severe disruptions, manipulations, alterations, or other malfeasance can result in cascading effects, often
2020) [https://perma.cc/V6HQ-R947].
101

Trindel, supra note 98.

102

See Josh Bersin, People Analytics: Here with a Vengeance, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2017, 11:39 AM), https://www.forbes.com
/sites/joshbersin/2017/12/16/people-analytics-here-with-a-vengeance/#76dd363932a1 [https://perma.cc/2Q9S-SKH4].
103
See generally CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND
THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2018).
104

platforms).

See Hiller, supra note 11, at 269–77 (describing the myriad ways that health data may be shared across different

105
Max Fisher, Syrian Hackers Claim AP Hack that Tipped Stock Market by $136 Billion. Is It Terrorism?, WASH. POST (Apr.
23, 2013, 4:31 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/04/23/syrian-hackers-claim-ap-hack-thattipped-stock-market-by-136-billion-is-it-terrorism [https://perma.cc/PL8F-RUUF].
106

Id.; Christopher Matthews, How Does One Fake Tweet Cause a Stock Market Crash?, TIME (Apr. 24, 2013),
https://business.time.com/2013/04/24/how-does-one-fake-tweet-cause-a-stock-market-crash/
[https://perma.cc/XJ6AZ2PE].
107
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referred to as “third order effects.”108 While resilience can be developed within some critical
infrastructure sectors due to comprehensive knowledge about the industry and abilities, the
heterogenous and diffuse CNoP, comprised of billions of devices, is more akin to epidemiological
management.109 As with the Covid-19 epidemic, strong state interventions are required in an attempt
to achieve improved outcomes. The absence of state legal and regulatory capacity to intervene can
result in deleterious outcomes.
The CNoP may also be compared to the treatment of cybersecurity within national
infrastructure protection because it crosses many sectors. The history of cybersecurity is one that
combines government intervention, public and private partnership, international norms, and interstate
disagreements and is reflected in some of the regulatory approaches to critical infrastructure protection
discussed in the following Part III.110 In this Part, differing United States and European approaches to
critical infrastructure security are explained and then applied to the NoP to analyze how to most
effectively protect these ubiquitous, national security, and intimately impactful systems.
III. PROTECTING THE CRITICAL NOP
With increased interdependence in critical infrastructure areas such as banking and financial
services, transportation systems, and power supply, as well as cyberattacks targeting domestic
infrastructure that originate extraterritorially, critical infrastructure protection has become a growing
concern for the global community, requiring international collaboration. 111 At the same time,
policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic disagree on how to achieve cyber resilience, as exemplified
by their opposing positions on cross-border access to electronic evidence or national security agencies’
reach into private people’s lives.112
This part first discusses the approach to critical infrastructure protection by the United States,
108
Herbert Lin, Operational Considerations in Cyber Attack and Cyber Exploitation, in CYBERSPACE AND NATIONAL
SECURITY: THREATS, OPPORTUNITIES, AND POWER IN A VIRTUAL WORLD (Derek S. Reveron ed., 2012).
109

Aaron F. Brantly, Public Health and Epidemiological Approaches to National Cybersecurity: A Baseline Comparison, in U.S.
NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY: INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, CONCEPTS AND ORGANIZATION (Damien Van Puyvelde & Aaron F.
Brantly eds., 2017).
110
See Raluca Bunduchi, et al., Between public and private – the nature of today’s standards (Aug. 25, 2004) (presented at
Standards, Democracy and the Public Interest workshop); WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE
POLITICS OF WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION (1998); Anders Henriksen, The end of the road for the UN GGE process: The future
regulation of cyberspace, 5 J. CYBERSECURITY 1, 1–9 (2009). See generally DAMIEN VAN PUYVELDE & AARON F. BRANTLY,
CYBERSECURITY: POLITICS, GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT IN CYBERSPACE (2019); Samantha Bradshaw et al., The Emergence of
Contention in Global Internet Governance, GLOB. COMM’N ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE (2015)
111
See JING DE JONG-CHEN & BOBBY O’BRIEN, A COMPARATIVE STUDY: THE APPROACH TO CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE U.S., E.U., AND CHINA 11 (2017), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/
default/files/media/documents/publication/approach_to_critical_infrastructure_protection.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RCA8UJR5] (recommending global collaboration to protect critical infrastructure); see also Antonio Segura Serrano, Cybersecurity: towards
a global standard in the protection of critical information infrastructures, 6 EUROPEAN J.L. & TECH. 1, 2–3 (2015) (citing to international
initiatives to strengthen cybersecurity and CIP such as the 2003 G8 Principles for Protecting Critical Information Infrastructures,
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 58/199 and 64/211, 2008 OECD Recommendation of the Council on the
Protection of Critical Information Infrastructures and 2015 Recommendations on Digital Security Risk Management, and ITU
Global Cybersecurity Agenda).
112

See infra Part III.B.
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and then compares the differing approach by the European Union. The two views of how to protect
critical infrastructure are then applied to an analysis of how to most effectively protect a sensitive NoP
infrastructure that is centered on persons as opposed to things and how to do so in an internationally
coherent way.
A. Critical Infrastructure Protection in the United States
The Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2001 defines critical infrastructure as “systems
and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction
of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security,
national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”113 Representative Thompson
explained that “[t]he definition attempts to strike a balance: to not be so vague as to include any
infrastructure in the United States (such as a short bridge connecting two small islands of no strategic
value), nor so rigid that, as new risks develop or evolve, the definition would become an obstacle to
security efforts.”114 Because of the built-in flexibility, it could be argued there is a lack of a clear
definition of what constitutes an asset, system, or network.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) states:
The nation’s critical infrastructure provides the essential services that underpin
American society and serve as the backbone of our nation’s economy, security, and
health. We know it as the power we use in our homes, the water we drink, the
transportation that moves us, the stores we shop in, and the communication systems
we rely on to stay in touch with friends and family.115
Sixteen sectors are presently classified as critical infrastructure: chemical; commercial facilities;
communications; critical manufacturing; dams; defense industrial base; emergency services; energy;
financial services; food and agriculture; government facilities; health care and public health; information
technology; nuclear reactors, materials, and waste; transportation; and water and wastewater. 116 While
the DHS has overall leadership of critical infrastructure protection, specific government agencies have
jurisdiction to lead particular sectors. 117
113

42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e).

114

Representative Bennie G. Thompson, A Legislative Prescription for Confronting 21st-Century Risks to the Homeland, 47
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 277, 284 (2010).
115
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 166 Stat. 2135 (codified as amended in 6 U.S.C.); Sector Risk
Management Agencies, CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, https://www.cisa.gov/sector-risk-managementagencies [https://perma.cc/LY8N-QMTB] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020); see also Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2001, 42
U.S.C. § 5195c(e).
116
Critical Infrastructure Sectors, CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY (Oct. 21, 2020),
https://www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors [https://perma.cc/FTK3-RW9T].
117

The White House Off. of the Press Sec’y, Presidential Policy Directive -- Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, OBAMA
WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 12, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policydirective-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil [https://perma.cc/5UAQ-66KS]. DHS states that there are twenty-two federal
agencies involved in critical infrastructure protection. See Homeland Security Enterprise, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (Oct. 22,
2021), https://www.dhs.gov/topic/homeland-security-enterprise [https://perma.cc/E9MU-RAGU] (discussing the importance
of bringing together the government and commercial entities to accomplish shared goals related to critical infrastructure
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In the United States, critical infrastructure protection is based on bringing together both the
public and private sectors in order to create norms of behavior, sharing vulnerabilities and threats,
information, best practices, and planning for resiliency.118 The voluntary, public-private partnership
approach to protecting critical infrastructure is a result of years of Presidential Directives across
multiple administrations and a few legislative actions between 1996 and 2003. 119 Major elements of
critical infrastructure protection, focusing on those most relevant to the discussion, include a National
Infrastructure Protection Plan,120 a Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,121 Sector Specific Agencies122 for
coordination, and Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations. 123 The National Cybersecurity
Protection Act124 created the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center
(NCCIC),125 later falling under the jurisdiction of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
(CISA). CISA and its sub-units provide the resources and leadership for public-private sector
information sharing.126
DHS promotes a risk management approach for the protection of critical infrastructure.127 It
protection).
118

See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NIPP 2013: PARTNERING FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AND
RESILIENCE 10–12 (2013), https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/national-infrastructure-protection-plan2013-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2FV-E9HD].
119
See Eldar Haber & Tal Zarsky, Cybersecurity for Infrastructure: A Critical Analysis, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 515, 525–31
(2017) (discussing Presidential Directives related to critical infrastructure protection up until 2013); Joe D. Whitley et al., Homeland
Security, Law, and Policy Through the Lens of Critical Infrastructure and Key Asset Protection, 47 JURIMETRICS 259, 261–63, 2007 (reviewing
a series of Presidential Directives and Homeland Security Directives between 1996 and 2003).
120
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PLAN: PARTNERING TO ENHANCE
PROTECTION AND RESILIENCY (2009), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED507739.pdf [https://perma.cc/NAP7-Z34G].
121

There have been multiple iterations of a national strategy, beginning with the 2003 version, and each primarily
adopts a voluntary collaborative role with the private sector and a limited regulatory approach. CYBERSECURITY &
INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE ix (2003), https://www.uscert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cyberspace_strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/GX75-KL9Y] (“In general, the private
sector is best equipped and structured to respond to an evolving cyber threat.”). The most recent strategy was issued in 2018,
confirming the expectation that market forces will enable cybersecurity efforts. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL
CYBER STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 14 (2018), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/S23F-36YQ] (“To enhance the resilience of
cyberspace, the Administration expects the technology marketplace to support and reward the continuous development,
adoption, and evolution of innovative security technologies and processes.”).
122
2015 Sector-Specific Plans, CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, https://www.cisa.gov/2015-sectorspecific-plans [https://perma.cc/73GU-UHZB].
123

Exec. Order No. 13691, 80 Fed. Reg. 9,349 (Feb. 20, 2015).

124

National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-282, 128 Stat. 3066 (2014) (codified as amended at
6 U.S.C. §§ 101, 148-50).
125

Id.

126

Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114–113, 129 Stat. 2935 (2015) (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 1501). Act is
referred to in § (c)(3) Div. N. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see § 101, 6 U.S.C. § 1501. This chapter, referred
to in § (c)(7) and § (e)(1)(J), was in the original “this Act,” meaning Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–296, 116 Stat.
2135, which is classified principally to this chapter.
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APPROACH,

DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., SUPPLEMENTAL TOOL: EXECUTING A CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE RISK MANAGEMENT
(2013), https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/NIPP-2013-Supplement-Executing-a-CI-Risk-
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integrates “physical, cyber, and human elements” 128 within the risk management framework that
includes a process of adopting goals and objectives within an infrastructure, assessment and analysis of
risks, risk management actions, and evaluation of effectiveness, in an iterative process.129 Thus, the
DHS approach does not segment “cyber elements of critical infrastructure,” but includes them as
integrative parts of other infrastructures and business operations that should nonetheless be treated
uniquely within the risk management process.130 In this light, DHS focuses primarily on Internet
communications but also engages in “Cyber-Dependent Infrastructure Identification” with agencies
and partners.131 It is fair to note that the Internet environment has changed drastically since 2013, and
the risk management approach may in practice look drastically different today as applied to a ubiquitous
system of data collection.132
As part of its continuing work, in 2016, DHS published Strategic Principles for Securing the
Internet of Things (IoT), noting that “[b]ecause our nation is now dependent on properly functioning
networks to drive so many life-sustaining activities, IoT security is now a matter of homeland
security.”133 The lack of even fundamental security in IoT devices led the DHS to lay fault at the lack
of clear obligations in the supply chain, together with the absence of norms, incentives, and
awareness.134 Consequently, DHS proposed the incorporation of security principles of security by
design, updates and vulnerability patches, best practices, a risk management approach, transparency,
and care in connectivity, directed at developers, manufacturers, service providers, and “business-level
consumers.”135
The U.S. voluntary public-private partnership approach, rather than a top-down regulatory
one, is premised in part on the fact that the majority of the critical infrastructure, including networks,
are privately owned, that technology is fast-moving, and that the market will respond to the need for
security most efficiently.136 The Cybersecurity Risk Management Framework, 137 a voluntary standard
set by the NIST, has had some success establishing norms of security behavior. 138 Some criticism of
Mgmt-Approach-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2E2-TMDZ] (part of the NIPP).
128

Id. at 2.

129

Id.

130

Id. at 5.

131

Id.

132

Id. at 1. The steps include: “1. Set Goals and Objectives, 2. Identify Infrastructure, 3. Assess and Analyze Risks, 4.
Implement Risk Management Activities, 5. Measure.”
133
DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES FOR SECURING THE INTERNET OF THINGS (IOT), 2 (Nov. 15,
2016),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Strategic_Principles_for_Securing_the_Internet_of_Things2016-1115-FINAL_v2-dg11.pdf [https://perma.cc/BKL8-GNML].
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Id. at 3.
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Id. at 3–4.
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See John J. Chung, Critical Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, and Market Failure, 96 OR. L. REV. 441, 464–69 (2018) (describing
benefits of a voluntary partnership with the private sector).
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Department of Commerce Launches Collaborative Privacy Framework Effort, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T
COMMERCE (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2018/09/department-commerce-launchescollaborative-privacy-framework-effort [https://perma.cc/G3KF-L3GK].
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the market-driven, voluntary approach is that it is too weak and ineffective to protect critical
infrastructure from threats at a proactive level.139
Scholars Haber and Zarsky articulate a broad analysis of the arguments for and against a
primarily voluntary approach to cybersecurity protection for critical infrastructure protection. 140 The
interrelated, but unique, points of debate identified are: reliance on the market based approach, impact
of disclosure and information sharing, and the effects of externalities. 141 While theory would indicate
that consumers will move the needle towards security protection by signaling their preference for such
in the market, Haber and Zarsky argue that the non-competitive nature of many markets, and
consumers’ lack of complete information about cyber security threats and protective measures, serve
to dilute the power of the market to produce protective actions.142 Second, negative externalities occur
because of the very nature of the network effect of cyber vulnerabilities, as “[t]he aggregate social harm
of a successful critical infrastructure cyber attack will most likely be higher than the aggregate harm to
both the firm and its consumers.”143 In response, it is unlikely that a company would take responsibility
for this broader range of impacts. Lastly, the fast changing nature of cyber threats and increasing
sophistication of bad actors create a challenging environment for individual companies, and as a result
they often lag behind in their knowledge and ability to provide an effective defense. 144 Informationsharing between companies, and between companies and governments, is fraught with disincentives
for sharing because of lack of trust and fear of liabilities. 145 In sum, Haber and Zarsky argue that there
are reasons to consider a stronger regulatory approach to protecting cyber critical infrastructures. 146 As
these arguments may apply to the protection of a NoP, they are revisited in Part C.
B. Critical Infrastructure Protection in the European Union
While key strategies and goals are similar, critical infrastructure protection implementation in
the European Union significantly differs from the U.S. approach. 147 In contrast to the United States’

Hiller, Predictability for Privacy in Data Driven Government, 20 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH 32, 42 (2019).
139
See Chung, supra note 135, at 469–472; Robert S. Metzger, Security and the Internet of Things, 14 ABA SCITECH LAW,
4, 7 (2018) (“The risks of trusting ‘market driven’ solutions will be unacceptable where dependency on the IoT creates serious
risk to critical infrastructure or national security”); Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1503,
1507–08 (2017) (“Many companies that operate critical infrastructure tend to underinvest in cyber-defense because of negative
externalities, positive externalities, free riding, and public goods problems. . . .”).
140

See generally Haber & Zarsky, supra note 118.

141

See generally id. at 542–57 (analyzing these three different regulatory strategies and their systematic shortcomings).

142

Id. at 544–46.

143

Id. at 547.

144

Id. at 548.

145

Id.

146

See generally id. at 550–59 (explaining that in light of disclosure requirements, information gaps, and externalities, a
government centered approach has advantages).
147
See AEGIS, WHITE PAPER ON CYBERSECURITY POLICY: COMMON GROUND FOR EU-US COLLABORATION 6
(2019) https://aegis-project.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/AEGIS-White-Paper-on-Cybersecurity-Policy.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2LGS-WE4R] (attributing the differences in part to “the layers of agencies and processes the US involves in
cybersecurity as well as the willingness of the respective legislative bodies to pass regulations”).
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voluntary approach to critical infrastructure protection, 148 in large part, EU regulation focuses on
certain areas of critical infrastructure protection, but makes protection in these areas mandatory for
European critical infrastructure operators. 149 While the U.S. regime is frequently described as a publicprivate partnership, European critical infrastructure protection—as argued below—can be qualified as
a fully integrated corporate regulatory feedback loop. 150 Further, as a top-down approach, the EU
regime is said to be “more streamlined” than the fragmented result of years of presidential directives in
the United States.151 However, the national laws of the individual member states supplement EU law,
and EU Directives intentionally provide only a minimum standard and the requirement of transposition
into national law.152 According to the preamble of the EU-Directive on European Critical
Infrastructures (ECI Directive), “[i]t is up to each Member State to decide on the most appropriate
form of action with regard to the establishment of [critical infrastructure operator security plans].” 153
Three points of EU critical infrastructure protection are relevant for comparison. A concerted
European policy on critical infrastructure emerged in 2004, with an official communication by the
European Commission as a response to terrorism threats. 154 Subsequently, the European Programme
of Critical Infrastructure Protection was established in 2006155—including the ECI Directive from
2008—which provides the overall legal framework for critical infrastructure protection in the European
Union, and is the first point of comparison. 156 The directive applies exclusively to the energy and
transportation sector, obliging owners or operators of critical infrastructure in these sectors to prepare
security plans and nominate so-called security liaison officers who will cooperate with the national
148

Defining it as “sectors that compose the assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the
United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security,
national public health or safety, or any combination thereof.” See DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., supra note 126 (and accompanying
text).
149

See Serrano, supra note 110, at 5 (citing to and stating that Exec. Order No. 13, 636, § 2 together with PPD-21
“offer[] a very large concept of ‘critical infrastructure’”).
150
The concept of CRFLs is described in Stephen K. Park & Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, A Firm-Driven Approach to Global
Governance and Sustainability, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 255, 289 (2015).
151

See AEGIS, supra note 146, at 5.

152

The EU-Directive on European Critical Infrastructures [hereinafter ECI Directive] in section 6 to the preamble of
the directive states that “[t]he primary and ultimate responsibility for protecting ECIs falls on the Member States and the
owners/operators of such infrastructures.” Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the Identification and
Designation of European Critical Infrastructures and the Assessment of the Need to Improve Their Protection, 2008 O.J. (L
345/75), pmbl. § 6. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32008L0114 [https://perma.cc/4PMRE6GU] [hereinafter ECI Directive]. Section 10 reads: “[t]his Directive complements existing sectoral measures at Community
level and in the Member States. Where Community mechanisms are already in place, they should continue to be used and will
contribute to the overall implementation of this Directive. Duplication of, or contradiction between, different acts or provisions
should be avoided.” Id. at § 10.
153

Id. at § 6.

154

See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Fight
Against
Terrorism,
COM
(2004)
0702
final
(Oct.
20,
2004),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/GA/TXT/?uri=celex:52004DC0702 [https://perma.cc/6TGN-8XYQ]GL8K-UAPD].
155
See Communication from the Commission of 12 December 2006 on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection,
COM
(2006)
786
final
(Dec.
12,
2006),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:l33260&from=EN [https://perma.cc/H3AG-96J2].
156

ECI Directive, supra note 151.
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authorities responsible for critical infrastructure protection in the given member state. 157 Due to the
European Union’s political structure as a union of sovereign states, the EU directive combines
preventative measures and reaction to threats with coordination requirements between member states.
There is no EU-wide regulation for other sectors that would be considered critical under the DHS
definition.158
The second significant critical infrastructure protection component in the European Union,
the Network and Information Security Directive (NIS Directive), was adopted in 2016 and is broader.159
The NIS Directive supplements the ECI Directive and it establishes an entity that can be regarded as
the European equivalent to NIST. The NIS Directive harmonizes cybersecurity and notification
requirements for “operators of essential services” (OESs)—the European equivalent to critical service
providers in the United States—across European member states.160
The third leg of critical infrastructure protection in the European Union is related to its wellknown laws and policies governing privacy and data protection, exemplified by its recent enactment of
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). 161 Furthermore, some European countries’
constitutions, such as the German Basic Law, include an individual right to the guarantee of
confidentiality and integrity of information technology systems, which must be carefully balanced
against the state’s interest in protecting critical infrastructure.162
The following sections discuss these three prongs of critical infrastructure protection in the
European Union as an example for an alternative approach to the current U.S. critical infrastructure
protection in a similarly developed, technologically-driven market economy.163

157

See ECI Directive, supra note 151, arts. 3, 5–6.

158

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, CYBERSECURITY
& INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY (Dec. 17, 2003), https://www.cisa.gov/homeland-security-presidential-directive-7
[https://perma.cc/8G5J-X4MU].
159

Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 Concerning Measures for
a High Common Level of Security of Network and Information Systems Across the Union, 2016 O.J. (L 194) 1, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.194.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2016:194:TOC
[https://perma.cc/S9PY-JQ69 ] [hereinafter NIS Directive].
160

NIS Directive, art. 5 § 2 defines operators of essential services as “(a) an entity [that] provides a service which is
essential for the maintenance of critical societal and/or economic activities; (b) the provision of that service depends on network
and information systems; and (c) an incident would have significant disruptive effects on the provision of that service.”
161
Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural
Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR]. See also Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J.
Solove, Reconciling Personal Information in the United States and European Union, 102 CAL. L. REV. 877, 877 (2014) (“In the United
States, privacy law focuses on redressing consumer harm and balancing privacy with efficient commercial transactions. In the
European Union, privacy is hailed as a fundamental right that can trump other interests.”).
162
See generally, Bundesverfassungsgereicht [BVerfG] [Constitutional Court] Feb. 27, 2008, 120 BVERFG 274 (Ger.)
(For English version, see https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2008/02/rs20080227_
1bvr037007en.html [https://perma.cc/VF9U-CA79]).
163

See Serrano, supra note 110, at 1 (suggesting that the United States and the European Union are among the first
countries that have adopted important cybersecurity regulation).
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1. ECI Directive
The ECI Directive “establishes a procedure for the identification and designation of
European critical infrastructures (‘ECIs’), and a common approach to the assessment of the need to
improve the protection of such infrastructures in order to contribute to the protection of people.”164
At first sight, the EU directive’s definition of critical infrastructure is similar to that of the U.S. DHS. 165
However, the slight differences in wording are telling of the different approaches to the role of the
individual within U.S. and EU critical infrastructure protection: according to the EU directive,
’critical infrastructure’ means an asset, system or part thereof located in Member
States which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety,
security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction
of which would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure
to maintain those functions.166
Remarkably, EU critical infrastructure – contrary to the DHS’s definition – is not limited to
“security, national economic security, national public health or safety,”167 but includes the “social wellbeing of people.”168 This definition puts the person right at the center of critical infrastructure
protection and expressively includes the protection of “vital societal functions.” 169
According to the directive, infrastructure qualifies as “critical” if it meets the so-called “crosscutting criteria threshold.”170 The directive defines these criteria as follows:
(a) casualties criterion (assessed in terms of the potential number of fatalities or
injuries);
(b) economic effects criterion (assessed in terms of the significance of economic loss
and/or degradation of products or services, including potential environmental
effects);
(c) public effects criterion (assessed in terms of the impact on public confidence,
physical suffering and disruption of daily life, including the loss of essential

164

ECI Directive, art. 1.

165

See Eimear Bourke, A War Without Bullets: Protecting Civilians in the Technology Trenches, 28 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 5
(2018) (comparing EU and U.S. definition of critical infrastructure and qualifying them as “similar”).
166

ECI Directive, art. 2 § (a).

167

See CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, supra note 114 (defining critical infrastructure as “assets,
systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or
destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any
combination thereof”).
168

ECI Directive, art. 2 § (a).

169

Id.

170

ECI Directive, art. 3 §§ 1 – 2.
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services).171
The threshold applicable to the cross-cutting criteria is “based on the severity of the impact
of the disruption or destruction of a particular infrastructure.” 172 When this level is reached is
“determined on a case-by-case basis by the Member State.”173 The directive obliges member states to
identify ECIs that meet the directive’s criteria, and the European Commission may assist member states
in this task.174 Operators or owners of ECIs are defined as “entities responsible for investments in,
and/or day-to-day operation of, a particular asset, system or part thereof designated as an ECI under
this Directive.”175 Designated ECI operators must appoint a security liaison officer, who communicates
and collaborates with the national critical infrastructure authorities. 176 They are further required to set
up operator security plans or “equivalent measures” that identify “important assets, a risk assessment
and the identification, selection and prioritisation of counter measures and procedures.” 177 Each
member state of the European Union must ensure that operator security plans are in place and
determine appropriate measures where “such plans do not exist[].” 178
In addition to measures targeting ECI operators, the directive aims to improve efficiency in
communication among different actors in critical infrastructure protection, namely ECI
operators/owners, national authorities, the scientific community, and EU authorities. To do so, the
directive requires member states to appoint “European critical infrastructure protection contact points”
that “coordinate European critical infrastructure protection within the Member State, with other
Member States and with the [European] Commission.” 179 The European Programme of Critical
Infrastructure Protection has established the European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure
Protection, which “provid[es] a framework within which experimental facilities and laboratories will
share knowledge and expertise in order to harmonise test protocols throughout Europe, leading to
better protection of critical infrastructures against all types of threats and hazards.” 180
171

Id.

172

Id.

173

Id.

174

ECI Directive, art. 3 § 1.

175

ECI Directive, art. 1 § (f).

176

See ECI Directive, pmbl. § 13 (specifying that “[w]here such a Security Liaison Officer does not exist, each Member
State should take the necessary steps to make sure that appropriate measures are put in place. It is up to each Member State to
decide on the most appropriate form of action with regard to the designation of Security Liaison Officers.”).
177
See ECI Directive, art. 5 (“The minimum content to be addressed by an ECI OSP procedure is set out in Annex II”
of the directive).
178

See ECI Directive, pmbl. § 11.

179

ECI Directive, art. 10 § 1, 2.

180

EU SCIENCE HUB, https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/network-bureau/european-reference-network-criticalinfrastructure-protection-erncip (last visited Oct. 31, 2020). [https://perma.cc/T4AK-S6ZN]. Hence, the directive establishes
both obligations for ECI operators towards their governments on the one hand, and member states’ obligations towards other
countries and the community on the other. Owners or operators of ECI, however, are expected to primarily with their respective
national authorities, not directly with the European Union. See ECI Directive, pmbl. § 16 (“Owners/operators of ECIs should
be given access primarily through relevant Member State authorities to best practices and methodologies concerning critical
infrastructure protection.”). This reflects the fundamental EU policy principle of subsidiarity, which assumes that issues are best
handled on the local level unless effective protection by reason of scale can better be achieved through a common EU-wide
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The three-tier collaboration established by the directive creates a system of corporate
regulatory feedback loops (CRFLs) between mostly private operators/owners of ECI and national
government entities on the one hand, and national governments and the European Commission on the
other hand. In general, a feedback loop is “a cycle that is comprised of output from, or information
about the result, of phenomena that causally influences other phenomena within the cycle and
perpetuates the phenomena as a circuit or loop that feeds back into itself.” 181 Previously, CRFLs have
been suggested as a policy instrument to enhance the legitimacy and efficiency of corporate
sustainability rulemaking.182 Transposed to European critical infrastructure protection, CRFLs can be
described as processes of social interaction between an operator/owner of ECI and governmental
entities (including both regulatory bodies and nonregulators) that enhance the visibility, identification,
and internalization of threats and risks to ECI, as well as costs and potential mutual benefits of
European critical infrastructure protection. 183 The ECI Directive, through its system of continuous,
institutionalized interactions among ECI operators, national governments, the European Programme
of Critical Infrastructure Protection, and community government, harnesses the power of such
feedback loops by sequentially linking a series of responsive actions to threats to the ECI.184
In this regard, the European critical infrastructure protection differs from the mostly
voluntary system in the United States, while preserving the flexibility and efficiency commonly
attributed to voluntary regulatory regimes and public-private partnerships.185 Through their interactions
with democratically legitimate government bodies, CFRLs force private actors to “take into account
shared public values and stakeholder interests.” 186 Hence, the European critical infrastructure
protection’s embedded regulatory feedback loops are better suited to take into account societal values,
such as securing democracy and protecting a person’s fundamental rights than a substantially voluntary
public-private partnership. Respect of these or other stakeholder concerns may be missing in a private
system that focuses on securing the infrastructure for more limited economic or national security
reasons.
approach. See ECI Directive, pmbl. § 20. Accordingly, under the directive, individual member states have the responsibility to
guarantee the flow of information from the community to the operators of ECI, and vice-versa. See ECI Directive, pmbl. § 14
(“Each Member State should collect information concerning ECIs located within its territory. The Commission should receive
generic information from the Member States concerning risks, threats and vulnerabilities in sectors where ECIs were
identified. . . .”). In 2018, the Commission launched an evaluation to assess the directive’s effectiveness and published the results
on the Commission’s website. See EVALUATION OF THE 2008 EUROPEAN CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
DIRECTIVE,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/1631-Evaluation-of-the-2008European-Critical-Infrastructure-Protection-Directive (last visited Oct. 31, 2020). [https://perma.cc/B3TB-SRQN].
181
See Keith Aoki et al., Pastures of Peonage: Tracing the Feedback Loop of Food Through IP, GMOs, Trade, Immigration, and
U.S., Agro-Maquilas, 4 NE. U. L. J. 1, 4 n.6 (2012) (defining feedback loops).
182

Park & Berger-Walliser, supra note 149, at 291.

183

Id. at 290–91.

184
ECI Directive, pmbl. § 14 provides: “Each Member State should collect information concerning ECIs located
within its territory. The Commission should receive generic information from the Member States concerning risks, threats and
vulnerabilities in sectors where ECIs were identified, including where relevant information on possible improvements in the
ECIs and cross-sector dependencies, which could be the basis for the development of specific proposals by the Commission on
improving the protection of ECIs, where necessary.”
185

See Park & Berger-Walliser, supra note 149, at 277 (“[Soft law’s] inherently informal, open-ended nature is the source
of its comparative advantage. The speed and flexibility of soft law often makes it easier to create.”).
186

Id. at 291.
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2. NIS Directive
The second leg of European critical infrastructure protection is the more recent NIS Directive
from 2016. The directive is part of a wider European cybersecurity strategy, 187 which “stresses that
EU’s core values apply as much in the digital as in the physical world, including the protection of
fundamental rights, freedom of expression, personal data and privacy, and access for all.”188 Hence,
privacy, data protection and cybersecurity are all part of a common policy. It is beyond the scope of
this article to describe EU cybersecurity policy in detail. 189 Accordingly, the following analysis will
concentrate on areas where cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection overlap, especially as
they relate to the CNoP. It will discuss other issues only to the extent necessary for a general
understanding of the NIS Directive and later the General Data Protection Regulation.
The NIS Directive is at the core of the EU legal framework for cybersecurity. Recognizing
that network and information systems play a vital role in the European economy and society, the
directive harmonizes cybersecurity and notification requirements for “operators of essential services”
(OESs)—the European equivalent to critical service providers—across European member states as
well as digital service providers (DSPs)—a difference that will be discussed in more detail below.190
According to the directive, an OES is an entity that “(a) . . . provides a service which is essential for the
maintenance of critical societal and/or economic activities; (b) . . . depends on network and
information systems; and (c) an incident would have significant disruptive effects on the provision of
that service.”191 OESs are required to notify the authorities “of incidents having a significant impact on
the continuity of the essential services they provide” in a timely manner. 192 Moreover, they must have
a “state of the art” risk management system in place that “ensure[s] a level of security of network and
information systems appropriate to the risk posed.” 193 It is up to the member states to identify OESs
in the following sectors: energy, transportation, banking and financial services, health, drinking water,
and digital infrastructure.194
While the NIS Directive, contrary to the NIST framework, establishes mandatory
requirements for OESs and—to a more limited extent—DSPs, the NIS Directive, just like NIST, does
not tell OESs what measures they must take to demonstrate compliance. 195 However, according to the
187

2013).
188

See generally Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, COM (2013) 1 final (Feb. 7,
Serrano, supra note 110, at 8.

189

This has been done expertly in Scott J. Shackelford & Scott Russell, Operationalizing Cybersecurity Due Diligence: A
Transatlantic Case Study, 67 S.C. L. REV. 609 (2016) (comparing U.S. and EU cybersecurity due diligence). See also U.S. CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE, TRANSATLANTIC CYBERSECURITY: FORGING A UNITED RESPONSE TO UNIVERSAL THREATS 20 (2017),
https://www.uschamber.com/TransatlanticCybersecurityReport [https://perma.cc/ZV8E-WED7] [hereinafter Transatlantic
Cybersecurity] (providing a comprehensive overview of EU cybersecurity frameworks).
190

NIS Directive, art. 1 § (d).

191

NIS Directive, art. 5 §§ (1)–(2) (outlining the criteria for identification of OESs).

192

NIS Directive, art. 14 § (3). The sectors to which the requirements apply are enumerated in Annex II of the directive.

193

Id. § (1).

194

After its entry into force, the directive required member states to identify OESs by November 9, 2018. NIS
Directive, art. 5 § (1). The sectors concerned are listed in Annex II.
195
AEGIS, supra note 146, at 9. The goal of both frameworks is to keep cybersecurity risk management systems
adaptable to rapid change, or, in the words of NIS Directive, “state of the art.” NIS Directive, art. 14 § (1); see also Transatlantic
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directive, “Member States shall, without imposing or discriminating in favour of the use of a particular
type of technology, encourage the use of European or internationally accepted standards and
specifications relevant to the security of network and information systems.” 196 This reference to
international standards represents a unique chance for the development of an internationally
harmonized cyber-risk management system that the U.S. Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 also
calls for.197 Increased reliance on international standards might also open the door to the development
of a legally enforceable international standard of cybersecurity care across critical infrastructures.198
Like any directive, the NIS Directive does not apply directly to the private companies that it
regulates.199 EU member states were under the obligation to transpose the Directive into national law
by May 2018.200 In addition to the requirements imposed on service providers, the Directive requires
member states to develop a national NIS strategy, and they must establish a Computer Security Incident
Response Team, as well as a national NIS authority. 201
For the purpose of this article, the most interesting feature of the NIS Directive, however, is
that it does not only apply to critical services providers also covered by NIST, but includes “digital
service providers” (DSPs) that are not necessarily critical providers. 202 DSPs are private companies that
provide information society services by electronic means at the individual request of a recipient of
services,203 such as online marketplaces, online search engines, and cloud computing services. 204 While
the internet’s importance as critical infrastructure for national defense, energy, finance, transportation,
and fundamental life functions has been largely recognized, DSPs—at least in the United States—have
Cybersecurity, supra note 188, at 27.
196

NIS Directive, art. 19 § (1).

197

See Nizan Geslevich Packin, Too-Big-to-Fail 2.0? Digital Service Providers as Cyber-Social Systems, 93 IND. L.J. 1211, 1231
(2018) (“The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 directed NIST to coordinate American agencies to work with other
jurisdictions to create international cybersecurity principles.”). For a comparison of NIST framework, GDPR, and NIS Directive,
see Transatlantic Cybersecurity, supra note 188, at 20.
198
See Shackelford & Russell, supra note 188, at 618 (“[T]he NIST Framework not only has the potential to shape a
standard of care for domestic critical infrastructure organizations, but also could help to harmonize global cybersecurity best
practices for the private sector writ large given active NIST collaborations with a number of nations. . . .”).
199

EU regulations are directly binding without additional domestic legislation, while EU directives require local
legislation in each member state. See European Union, Regulations, Directives and Other Acts, EUROPA, https://europa.eu/europeanunion/law/legal-acts_en [https://perma.cc/6WY4-PJL2].
200

NIS Directive, art. 25.

201

NIS Directive, arts. 7–10.

202

A distinction that is not unproblematic. See generally Steve Ritter & Laura Schulte, Rechtliche Anforderungen an Anbieter
digitaler Dienste, die zugleich kritische Infrastrukturen sind, 35 COMPUT. & RECHT 617 (2019) (Ger.).
203
See NIS Directive, art. 4 § (5) (referencing “Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the
Council” “laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on
Information Society services”); NIS Directive, art. 1 § (1)(b) (defining Information Society service as “any service normally
provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services.”).
204
NIS Directive, Annex III. The Directive restricts DSPs to these three categories. Providers of other categories of
digital services such as streaming, online gaming, or social network providers are not included. See Jones Day, The New EU
Cybersecurity Directive: What Impact on Digital Service Providers?, JONES DAY INSIGHTS (Aug. 2016),
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2016/08/the-new-eu-cybersecurity-directive-what-impact-on-digital-service-providers
[https://perma.cc/F9L8-KRLM] (mentioning that inclusion of these DSPs was debated during the legislative process but were
ultimately left out of the Directives).
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received far less regulatory attention. 205 Their inclusion in the NIS Directive was not without opposition
during the legislative process.206 This explains the limitation to only three categories of DSPs, and it led
to lighter requirements regarding their “state of the art” risk management processes and notification
requirements than those required for OESs.207
With the move towards a CNoP and its dependence on big data, DSPs, at least in certain
categories, such as cloud computing services that store or process the data, become increasingly
important for the maintenance of critical societal and/or economic activities. If medical decisions or
police action in real time depend on these services, disruption of, or an attack against them, could have
a severe effect on life critical functions and ultimately deprive people of their fundamental rights or
lead to death. Hence, it can and should be argued that these DSPs are in fact critical service providers
and should be treated as such.
3. Data Privacy and Security
The diverging approaches to privacy and data protection between the U.S. and the EU are
explained by fundamentally different constitutional underpinnings for privacy protection in general,
and data privacy specifically, on both sides of the Atlantic. The constitutional characteristics, in turn,
can be attributed to historic developments that, in the aftermath of World War II in Europe, led to the
enactment of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedom (ECHR). The ECHR, in Article 8, establishes a fundamental right to “respect for private and
family life.”208 This has since been interpreted to encompass a fundamental right to protection of
personal data.209 In Europe, privacy is understood as an expression of human dignity that is inviolable
and that the state has an obligation to protect. 210 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
205
See Geslevich Packin, supra note 196, at 1243 (describing the internet’s role as critical infrastructure); id. at 1232
(explaining that this regulatory oversight may be caused by “the lack of support from the private sector” and the fact that “while
many believe that major attacks will happen soon, cyberattacks in the United States have not resulted in death or drastic damage
to national security or the economy thus far”).
206
See Jones Day, supra note 203 (stating that “opponents viewed cyberattacks on [DSPs] as insufficiently significant
and therefore argued against additional regulation, which would potentially negatively affect innovation”).
207

be lighter.”).

NIS Directive, art. 16; see also id. pmbl. (stating that “the security requirements for digital service providers should

208

The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms states in Article 8:
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life . . . [t]here shall be no interference. . . .” European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
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come as no surprise that the first Data Protection Act was passed in Germany. See Eric Caprioli et al., The Right to Digital Privacy:
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Union from 2000 and Article 16(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union further
provide a specific data protection right to citizens in the European Union. 211 The GDPR and its
predecessor directive are outgrowths of this fundamental EU right to data protection by the European
governments.212 In the European Union, the implication of personal data of any kind triggers the
application of wide-ranging EU or national data protection laws.213 Broadly speaking, individual data
processing is essentially forbidden unless there is a valid reason for doing so and it is done as narrowly
as possible.214
This EU recognition and protection of individual rights to data privacy is reflected in the NIS
and ECI directives. Accordingly, the NIS Directive, in paragraph 75 to the preamble states:
This Directive respects the fundamental rights, and observes the principles,
recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in
particular the right to respect for private life and communications, the protection of
personal data. . . . This Directive should be implemented in accordance with those
rights and principles.215
The ECI Directive contains a similar provision for critical infrastructure providers in
general.216 If a conflict arises, NIS and ECI directives need to be interpreted in light of the fundamental
right to data privacy. This does not mean that a critical service provider or DSP would not be able to
process personal data that is necessary to provide its life-critical service. Limitations are possible if
provided for by law and the essence of the fundamental right is guaranteed.217 With regard to critical
infrastructure protection or network security, these legal grounds are provided for by the ECI or NIS
directive. However, because data privacy is a fundamental right, limitations ought to be interpreted
Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1173–76 (2004) (describing the evolution of privacy law
in France).
211
ECFR art. 8(1), 2000 O.J. (C 364) 10; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 16(1), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47. The ECFR is a compilation of all “personal, civic, political, economic and
social rights enjoyed by people within the EU.” Why do we need the Charter?, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/aiddevelopment-cooperation-fundamental-rights/your-rights-eu/eu-charter-fundamental-rights/why-do-we-need-charter_en (last
visited Nov. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/CTH5-WTTW]. It is different from the ECHR as it covers “all the rights found in the
case law of the Court of Justice of the EU, the rights and freedoms enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights,
other rights and principles resulting from the common constitutional traditions of EU countries and other international
instruments.” Id.
212
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the processing of personal data is a fundamental right.”).
213
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Companies, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 287, 290 (2019); see also Schwartz & Solove, supra note 160, at 880–881 (stating that “[i]n the European
Union, privacy law is viewed in broad terms” and that “[g]iven these differences, it is no surprise that EU privacy law has a much
broader definition of PII than U.S. privacy law.”).
214
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narrowly and the processing of personal data must be restricted to the “extent strictly necessary and
proportionate.”218 This is different from the simple “balancing” between two rights under U.S. law. 219
Hence, in Europe, a mandatory cell phone app that helps the government track the spread of COVID19 in the interest of public health is not illegal per se, but by design needs to be limited to process only
personal data strictly necessary to fulfill its purpose. 220
Building upon the criticality of a NoP infrastructure, the following section argues that the
differing U.S. and EU approaches to critical infrastructure protection from threats and vulnerabilities
is inadequate to protect it and should be standardized for a global approach to protecting fundamental
rights and increasing national security.
C. Proposed Critical Protection for the NoP
From a U.S. perspective, an argument can be made that the CNoP should be categorized as a
critical national infrastructure under its current structure. The DHS description of critical infrastructure
poses the question of whether the system provides essential services that underpin American society
and serve as the backbone of the nation’s economy, security, and health. The disruptions described
above, voting and patient safety, are certainly parts of our national backbone and deserving of critical
protection. However, the United States is unlikely to view these as part of other infrastructures and will
likely not recognize the citizen-centric harms that could arise. In large part, this is because of the United
States’s piecemeal approach to data privacy. Broadly, personally identifiable information is protected
under certain federal privacy and state laws, rather than an integrated approach to protection, that leads
to a narrow sectorial approach to data privacy.221 The basic assumption in the United States is that
private and government bodies are allowed to process individual data “unless it causes a legal harm or
is otherwise restricted by law.”222 A detailed description of data privacy laws in both the United States
and Europe is beyond the scope of this article, and has been expertly done elsewhere. 223 By means of
218
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219
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220
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comparison, however, “[i]n the United States, privacy law focuses on redressing consumer harm and
balancing privacy with efficient commercial transactions. In the European Union, privacy is hailed as a
fundamental right that can trump other interests.” 224
In Europe, because privacy is considered an expression of a person’s dignity, the NoP will
more easily be recognized as a critical infrastructure. Human dignity, according to Article 1 of the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and national constitutions, is an inviolable
fundamental right that deserves higher protection than any other right.225 In the NoP, where the person
becomes an integral part of the infrastructure, personal data is a natural extension of the person
herself— and may thus qualify as a critical asset of the infrastructure. Given the NoP’s reliance on
personal data, a personal data breach is likely to pose a threat not only to the individual who owns or
is concerned by that data, but indeed the entire infrastructure, hence justifying enhanced protection.
Consider, for example, the impact a loss of confidence in the safety or confidentiality of personal data
could have on voting, freedom of expression, union membership or other democratic rights, let alone
the functioning of the digital economy. EU law recognizes these interdependencies. It is no coincidence
that the NIS directive and GDPR were enacted in the same year. By European conception,
cybersecurity and data protection are part of a cohesive digital strategy. It follows that critical
infrastructure providers as well as DSPs who process personal data, are subject to both the notification
requirements in the NIS directive and the GDPR.226 Furthermore, as an example of national law, the
German constitutional court as early as in 1983 addressed the relationship between personal data
processing and individual liberties, summarized this way:
According to the Court, individuals who do not know whether, which of, by whom,
for what purposes, and under what conditions their personal data are processed will
inevitably tend to conform themselves to the processor’s potential expectations. In
doing so, these individuals renounce their power to freely express their opinions, to
demonstrate or join a political party, union, or any other association—in short, to
exercise their fundamental rights. For this reason, the Court concluded that a
democratic society cannot and will not function without rules governing the
processing of personal data. 227
Hence, it is no surprise that from a European perspective, data protection is seen as part of

sides of the Atlantic, in the context of transatlantic data trade). See generally Paul J. Watanabe, An Ocean Apart: The Transatlantic
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NIS and GDPR).
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EU policy to achieve cyber resilience.228 In this regard, EU critical infrastructure protection in the light
of the general data protection regulation, may pave the way to a more seamless recognition of the
concept of protection for the CNoP—centered around persons, and their data—as opposed to things.
GDPR’s impact has not been isolated to European citizens or markets. Laws such as GDPR are having
an impact in the United States. The global nature of the Internet necessitates multinational legal and
regulatory standards, and many U.S. firms are adhering to European law simply out of necessity. 229
The fragmentation of American approaches to U.S. cybersecurity remains a challenge. Recent
work done by the United States Cyberspace Solarium Commission reiterates many of the fundamental
issues highlighted above.230 The report provides strong support for the recognition of the impact of
cybersecurity risks and vulnerabilities on individuals. Yet in its recommendations, the emphasis remains
on governmental and public-private partnerships across sectors at levels above the individual. 231 By
privileging higher-level actors, the impacted parties at lower levels are often consolidated by default
into higher level organizational categorizations. Yet the concerns of individuals differ substantially from
those of most public and private organizations. The objectives of the firm and the citizen are not the
same. And the critical life functions of the latter are often not addressed by remediating cybersecurity
concerns in the former.
Thus, a related but different question is whether personal data should be considered a unique
part of the NoP, by itself, and consequently, enjoy the same infrastructure protection as security, public
health, or network and information systems. As mentioned earlier, for purposes of defining a critical
infrastructure that is entitled to protection by a partnership between government and private entities,
the boundary is whether the NoP infrastructure affects critical life functions, deserving enhanced
protection from threats and vulnerabilities.232 If personal data is more broadly included, then data
privacy would be added to the list of protected functions in Article 2(a) of the ECI directive, and the
DHS definition of critical infrastructure, depending on whether data protection is considered “life
critical,” and its disruption or destruction would have a significant impact on society as a result of the
failure to maintain its function.233 Overcoming historical differences, a global adoption of this approach
would yield heightened security around the globe.
IV. CONCLUSION
Intimately connected technology is increasingly interweaving persons in ways that extend the
importance and relevance of critical infrastructure protections to the person. The present disjointed
228
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and fragmented approaches of Europe and the United States exacerbate the problems and elevate the
importance of reconsidering designations of critical infrastructure. A new designation of a CNoP does
not obviate or alleviate the risks associated with the technologies; rather, it begins to shift the burden
of risk mitigation and protection away from those least capable, towards the state and its partners. Just
as individuals require the intervention of the state in times of severe insecurity due to natural or human
induced disaster in conventional sectors, they similarly require the intervention of the state in the rapidly
developing NoP infrastructure. The protection of life critical functions sustained and enhanced by the
CNoP is concurrently a human rights and national security issue. The proposed CNoP framework
integrates security from the individual outward, further impacting security at multiple levels.
Limiting critical infrastructures to higher levels within the digital ecosystem fails to address
vulnerabilities associated with individuals embedded in the ecosystem, leaving open vulnerabilities and
exposing populations to forces largely beyond their control. Proactively addressing the issue of CNoP
begins the likely long and arduous process of ensuring security of citizenship, economic necessities, and
personhood in an increasingly complex digital world. The risks posed by the NoP and to the
infrastructure around it will grow in the coming years. A failure to address this concern will result in
harms that are pervasive, systemic, and deleterious to the security of both the citizen and the nation.
Based on sensors, data collection and aggregation, internet communications, and decision
triggers, this article establishes a foundation for understanding an infrastructure that both surrounds
and integrates the individual as part of an inescapable structure: the NoP. The proposed CNoP
framework defines life critical functions as fundamental rights and obligations in three areas:
citizenship, economic necessities, and personhood. In an infrastructure connected by persons, these
life-critical functions must become embedded into national security protection across all critical
infrastructures. Ultimately, protecting the CNoP results in protecting the privacy and decisional
integrity of individual data processing. The government, as the collective body of democratic
deliberation within a society, formed for the protection of rights, is duty-bound to protect its citizenry.
The U.S. Constitutional justification for the designation of the CNoP is enshrined in the obligation of
common defense, general welfare, and security.234 Securing the “Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our posterity”235 is at risk due to the pervasive and systemic challenges faced by citizenry as they
increasingly become part of the structure to be secured. Establishing protection for the CNoP reorients
the scope and focus to that of the citizen, the person—the building block of the nation. Ensuring the
security at the individual level is imperative for maintaining national security for all.
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